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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING:
EXAMINING SUPPLIER DIVERSITY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
by
Evelyn Trammell
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Meredith Newman, Co-Major Professor
Professor Mohamad Alkadry, Co-Major Professor
Government organizations have struggled to balance democratic values of
inclusiveness and equity with an efficient and effective bureaucracy since the early years
of the administrative state. A representative bureaucracy offers a solution where effective
and efficient public service delivery can be achieved while reflecting the interests of
historically underrepresented social groups in policy decisions. The theory of
representative bureaucracy states that organizational actors that share characteristics with
constituents are more likely to respond to their interests through policies and
implementation activities. Employing a mixed methodology, this study examines whether
and how representativeness of local government decision-makers affects contracting
policy implementation by assessing the degree of supplier diversity of local governments.
Supplier diversity contracting policies aim to enhance access, limit discrimination,
correct historical injustices, and empower traditionally underserved populations.
This study contributes to the broader understanding of representative bureaucracy
in the local government contracting environment and yields actionable recommendations
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for public managers. The contracting environment is often driven by efficiency and
guided by legal stipulations. The results of this study demonstrate that even while
operating within the constraints of this environment, minority representation at the street
level is related to active implementation. Additionally, street level bureaucrats who
assume a minority representative role are more likely to have greater motivation for
supplier diversity. Elected officials also have an important role driving supplier diversity
from the top. However, this is a product of the political nature of contracting decisions
where the push from elected officials is likely an effort to be responsive to their
constituents.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Government organizations have struggled to balance democratic values of
inclusiveness and equity with an efficient and effective bureaucracy since the early years
of the administrative state (Frederickson, 1996). A representative bureaucracy offers a
solution in which effective and efficient public service delivery can be achieved while
reflecting the interests of diverse and historically underrepresented social groups in
policy decisions (Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, & Li, 2015). The
theory of representative bureaucracy states that organizational actors that share
characteristics with constituents (passive representation) are more likely to respond to
their interests through policies and implementation activities (active representation)
(Mosher, 1968; Krislov, 1974; Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser,
Wilkins, Meier, & Holland, 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel
& Loscocco, 2005; Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Riccucci et al., 2015; Bishu & Kennedy,
2019). The assumption of representative bureaucracy theory is that passive representation
will lead to active representation (Mosher, 1968; Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Meier &
Bohte, 2001). Bradbury and Kellough (2008) indicate that the premise for active
representation is derived from the similarity between demographics and social
backgrounds of bureaucrats and the public served. This influences attitudes and values of
bureaucrats, and consequently, impacts their policy decisions and implementation
activities. Another facet of representative bureaucracy is symbolic representation. In this
case, constituents perceive bureaucratic actions as legitimate because of shared
demographic characteristics, identification, and/or experiences regardless of whether
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purposeful actions are taken by the bureaucrat (Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009; Gade
& Wilkins, 2013; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, & Lavena, 2014; Riccucci et al., 2015).
Within local governments, the supplier diversity environment is unique in that it
is subject to the effects of representative bureaucracy and the overall contracting
environment (Brudney, Fernandez, Ryu, & Wright, 2005; Smith & Fernandez, 2010;
Fernandez, Malatesta, & Smith, 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). Supplier diversity
refers to government contracting initiatives aiming to enhance access, limit
discrimination, correct historical injustices, and empower disadvantaged small business
owners (McCrudden, 2004; Fernandez et al., 2012). It is a socio-economic equity
initiative operating in the contracting environment where efficiency is key and often
mandated (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006). The contracting environment is also
constrained by legal stipulations and is political in nature, making it necessary to balance
stakeholder preferences and competing priorities.
The purpose of the present research is to further examine active representation by
assessing contracting practices—namely, women and racial/ethnic minority owned
business contracting—of local governments in the United States. The present research
contributes to representative bureaucracy theory and government contracting literature by
demonstrating how social equity and inclusion can be integrated with existing public
service delivery processes of local government agencies. Findings also have implications
for local government contracting practice where efficiency often trumps equity.
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
Government spending impacts the community and local economy. In 2018, state
and local governments spent approximately 1.8 trillion dollars (United States Department
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of Labor, 2019). Sixty four percent of spending was directed toward procurement of
goods and services (United States Department of Labor, 2019). This spending power can
be used to achieve policy goals that extend beyond the purchase of goods and service
provision and address issues directly impacting communities (e.g. climate change,
affordable housing, inequality, and economic development). Yet, adoption and
implementation of procurement policies to address pressing issues affecting communities
vary across local governments in the United States (Prier, Schwerin, & McCue, 2016;
Alkadry, Trammell, & Dimand, 2019; Trammell & Dimand, 2019).
Local governments can utilize contracting policies and programs as tools to
achieve policy goals and specific outcomes across a range of policy areas (Prier et al.,
2016; Alkadry et al., 2019). In contracting, however, efficiency is often the driving force
behind contract awards. This sometimes results in disparities in which certain social
groups unable to compete for contracting opportunities. In order to address these
contracting disparities, local governments adopt supplier diversity policies.
Supplier diversity policies aim to balance equity and efficiency in government
contracting. Local governments implement supplier diversity to mitigate contracting
disparities while also enhancing their local economy. These intentional policies
encourage active participation in government contracting opportunities for
underrepresented groups such as businesses owned by women, racial/ethnic minority
groups, and other disadvantaged social groups (United States Small Business
Administration, 2017). The present research specifically addresses supplier diversity
policies for businesses owned by women and racial/ethnic minority groups (hereafter
referred to as minority groups).

3

Women and minority owned businesses have created jobs and increased income
for disadvantaged groups as a result of opportunities granted by supplier diversity
policies (Rice, 1992; Terman, 2014). In 2012, minority owned firms comprised
approximately 17% of all businesses with employees nationwide, employed
approximately 7.1 million people in the United States, and generated approximately $1.2
trillion in receipts (United States Department of Commerce, 2016). As of 2012, women
owned business enterprises comprised approximately 14% of all businesses with
employees nationwide, employed approximately 6.7 million people in the United States,
and generated approximately $994.5 billion in receipts (National Women’s Business
Council, n.d.).
While women and minority owned businesses comprise approximately half of all
firms in the United States, the access and opportunities to participate and compete in
government contracting continues to be problematic. As lowest cost purchasing remains
embedded in government procurement, the challenge of balancing efficiency with
inclusiveness and equity in local government contracting persists. When minority and
women owned businesses are unable to compete, a large number of businesses are
omitted from contracting and competitive bidding opportunities.
Providing greater opportunities for women and minority owned businesses to
participate in government contracting is beneficial for the local government agency,
women and minority owned businesses, and for members of the community. First, this
helps local governments address issues of social equity and economic development in
their community. Second, more competition in the market can lead to better prices for
governments. Third, contracting with women and minority owned businesses provides
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jobs, which helps to maintain and even grow these businesses. Finally, these contracts
generate revenue for employees of these businesses, who often reside in these
communities.
1.3 Significance of the Study
The present research examines the extent that representativeness of local
government decision-makers impacts implementation of local government contracting
policies by assessing supplier diversity. Supplier diversity refers to government
contracting initiatives aiming to enhance access, limit discrimination, correct historical
injustices, and empower disadvantaged small business owners (McCrudden, 2004;
Fernandez et al., 2012). This research builds on the theory of representative bureaucracy,
examining the extent to which social equity is incorporated in contracting—an
environment where balancing social equity and efficiency remains a challenge.
While studies on representative bureaucracy have examined various facets of
theory (passive, active, symbolic) in several policy areas (Stein, 1986; Selden, 1997;
Hindera & Young, 1998; Brudney, Hebert, & Wright, 2000; Weiher, 2000; Keiser et al.,
2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O’Toole, & Walker, 2005;
Riccucci et al., 2014), few have examined the impact of representative bureaucracy in
contracting—where efficiency is key and often mandated. Furthermore, research on
representative bureaucracy in contracting has been limited to quantitative analysis at the
federal level of government (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Smith et al., 2012; Brunjes &
Kellough, 2018). The present study expands on both contracting and representative
bureaucracy research (i.e., Saidel & Loscocco, 2005; Brown et al., 2005; Smith &
Fernandez, 2010; Smith et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018).
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Existing research on representative bureaucracy in contracting has provided
evidence that minority representation within federal government agencies is a significant
predictor of increased contracts being awarded to minority owned firms (Smith &
Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). Fernandez et al.,
(2012) noted that female passive representation, however, did not translate into active
representation. More recent research on representative bureaucracy in contracting in
federal government has demonstrated effects across different races and ethnicities
(Brunjes & Kellough, 2018).
The present study effectively contributes to the broader understanding of
representative bureaucracy in the contracting environment. First, this research employed
mixed methodology to comprehensively analyze the extent to which social equity and
inclusion have been integrated into public service delivery processes of local
governments. I established an index to measure contract policy implementation of local
governments through assessment of supplier diversity activity—subsequently
incorporating case study research. Second, this research examined the impacts of
representative bureaucracy in the local government contracting environment, where
various factors influence policy goals and outcomes. Local governments are subject to
institutional, organizational, and environmental influences that differ from those
impacting the federal level of government. The model of representative bureaucracy is
distinct in this environment. Finally, this research yields actionable recommendations for
public managers seeking to effectively implement social equity in contracting policies of
their organizations.
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1.4 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework utilized in this research draws from representative
bureaucracy to examine how diversity at multiple levels in local government agencies
impacts supplier diversity policy implementation. According to the theory of
representative bureaucracy, bureaucratic actors that share demographic characteristics
with the population they serve (passive representation) respond to the interests of these
constituents through various policies and implementation activities (active representation)
(Meier, 1993; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa &
Selden, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005; Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Riccucci et al.,
2015; Bishu & Kennedy, 2019). The assumption of the theory of representative
bureaucracy is that passive representation leads to active representation. Another facet of
representative bureaucracy is symbolic representation. Gade and Wilkins (2013) noted
that, “passive representation can also translate into symbolic representation, where
representation may change the attitudes and behaviors of the represented client without
any action taken by the bureaucrat” (p. 267).
Previous literature has identified the conditions necessary for passive
representation to translate to active representation (Meier, 1993; Meier & Bohte, 2001;
Keiser et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco,
2005; Bradury & Kellough, 2008). First, the “demographic characteristic should be
highly salient” (Meier, 1993, p. 393-394). Second, bureaucrats should have some
decision-making authority in how to perform their jobs. This is referred to as bureaucratic
discretion. Third, the policy decision should be relevant to the demographic characteristic
that is represented by the bureaucrat. Fourth, research has demonstrated that active
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representation is more likely to occur at the street level than at higher levels in the
organization (Thompson, 1976; Meier, 1993; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). Street level
bureaucrats are often front-line workers that “make decisions about the direct provision
of services” (Sowa & Selden, 2003, p. 700). In the present research, those with direct
engagement in supplier diversity—procurement heads and related supplier diversity
program staff—have an important role in implementation activities as street level
bureaucrats. Finally, Meier (1993) noted the need for political support for active
representation to occur.
Additionally, studies on representative bureaucracy have determined that only
certain circumstances provide the necessary environment for active representation to
occur, and that circumstances may differ in cases of female and minority representation
(Selden, 1997; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Fernandez et al., 2012).
Further differentiation is necessary within the minority grouping as well. It is important
to recognize that not all minorities should be viewed the same (Selden 1997; WatkinsHayes, 2011; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). Distinct minority groups are affected by
different things, and have unique preferences, identities, history, socialization
experiences, and values. For example, Selden (1997) found varying experiences for
Native Americans, Hispanics, African Americans, and Asians in allocation of resources
by the Farmers’ Home Administration. Experiences can differ based on political,
economic, and social status within a racial community as well (Watkins-Hayes, 2011;
Vinopal, 2019). This is reflected, for example, through “differences in parenting and
access to cultural capital and developmental opportunities,” which affects life
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experiences related to “health, education, income, crime, and others” (Vinopal, 2019, p.
2).
An administrator assuming a representative role can also impact whether passive
representation translates into active representation (Selden, 1997; Selden, Brudney, &
Kellough, 1998; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003). The representative role “refers to the
willingness of bureaucrats to see themselves as advocates for, or representatives of”
minority or gender interests (Bradbury & Kellough, 2008, p. 698). Prior research has
found that adoption of the representative role has a greater impact on active
representation than the race/ethnicity or gender of administrators themselves (Selden,
1997; Selden et al., 1998; Keiser et al., 2002; Bradbury & Kellough, 2008).
On the other hand, Meier (1993) noted that passive representation does not always
translate into active representation for several reasons. First, the degree of routinization in
the organization may limit the amount of discretion a bureaucrat has in performing tasks
(Meier, 1993). Second, minorities and women may not be positioned to influence policy
outcomes. Third, minorities and women that have reached upper level positions may have
experienced organizational socialization—in which their personal values have been
superseded by agency values (Meier, 1993; Fernandez et al., 2012).
Research has also indicated that the organizational and institutional context
impacts the extent to which active representation exists (Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser et
al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, &
Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Krause, Feiock, & Hawkins, 2016; Vinopal, 2019). Keiser et al.
(2002) noted that bureaucrats are “shaped and constrained by the contingencies of context
and circumstance” (p. 555). Furthermore, “institutional structures help to determine the
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purpose and scope of bureaucrats’ work and how much discretion they have carrying out
their tasks” (Kieser et al., 2002, p.555).
Contracting policies, in particular, are subjected to institutional influence in the
local government setting—where policy decisions and actions “are guided and
constrained by law” (Martin, Berner, & Bluestein, 2007, p. 511). These policies can be
driven by local ordinances and fiscal federalism—where federal and state funding is
contingent on ordinance compliance by local governments (Smith & Fernandez, 2010;
Fernandez et al., 2012; Blount & Hill, 2015). Because the present research examined
representative bureaucracy in the contracting environment, the organizational and
institutional context of local government organizations was included in the theoretical
framework.
Research on representative bureaucracy in contracting has identified the role of
minority representation when examining federal contract awards (Smith & Fernandez,
2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). Smith and Fernandez (2010)
noted the importance of minority representation in federal agencies for the promotion of
“equity in government contracting” (p. 94). These works build on previous studies on
representative bureaucracy, noting direct benefits to minority owned businesses through
contract awards when key procurement and contracting staff are minorities (Smith &
Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018).
Bishu and Kennedy (2019) stated that broader “application of representative
bureaucracy theory is needed to better understand its strengths and limitations” (p.2).
Supplier diversity operates in a unique environment where efficiency has historically
been highly valued (Brown et al., 2006). To obtain a comprehensive understanding of
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representative bureaucracy in the contracting environment of local government in the
United States, the conceptual framework developed for the present study accounted for
individual, organizational, and environmental factors. The extent that diversity at
multiple levels in the organization impacts supplier diversity policy implementation in
local governments was included in the conceptual framework. Gender and racial/ethnic
representation are the main predictors and are accounted for at the following levels:
elected official, city manager/chief executive officer (CEO), and procurement head.
1.5 Research Questions and Hypotheses
The supplier diversity environment is unique in that it is subject to the effects of
representative bureaucracy and the effects of the overall contracting environment
(Brudney et al., 2005; Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Blount & Hill,
2015; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). In general, efficiency has been viewed as a key
principle in contracting (Brown et al., 2006). A representative bureaucracy is one way
that equity and efficiency can be balanced within this environment.
The present research builds on the theory of representative bureaucracy by
examining how diversity of elected officials, city managers/CEOs, and procurement
heads impacts supplier diversity policy implementation. Supplier diversity, in this
research, specifically refers to initiatives encouraging participation of women and
minority owned businesses in contracting opportunities of local governments. This study
assessed whether active representation is present and assessed the extent to which active
representation occurs.
The following research questions were investigated:
1) What factors impact supplier diversity policy implementation of local governments?
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2) Does decision-maker diversity play a role in supplier diversity policy
implementation?
Based on prior research on representative bureaucracy, the following hypotheses are
presented.
H1: Local governments with more diverse leadership will have a higher degree of
supplier diversity than local governments with less diversity.
H2: Local governments with more diversity at the procurement head level are more
likely to actively implement supplier diversity than those with diversity at other
leadership levels.
1.6 Research Design
This research employed mixed methodology to examine the impacts of
representative bureaucracy on contracting policy—namely, supplier diversity—in local
governments in the United States. This approach is instrumental in providing a more
comprehensive understanding of representative bureaucracy in the local government
contracting environment. In describing the benefits of a mixed methodology, Johnson,
Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007) noted that the collective data obtained through
quantitative and qualitative techniques provide a deeper and more meaningful
understanding of the research topic. Hesse-Biber (2010) further noted that mixed
methodology can be used to validate findings. Comparing the findings of the two
methods helps researchers find convergence or contradictions and provides a better
overall picture of the research topic.
My research design included two phases: a survey and two case studies. The
survey was conducted first. The target population for the survey were chief procurement
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officers or head of procurement operations in local governments nationwide. Then, case
studies were conducted of two large cities with varying demographics: City of Portland
(Oregon) and City of San Antonio (Texas). In the City of Portland, local government staff
were interviewed for the case study. In the City of San Antonio, local government staff
and stakeholders external to the agency were interviewed. A public meeting related to
supplier diversity was also audited in the City of San Antonio.
The data for the quantitative phase were obtained from various sources. First, a
survey instrument was used to obtain diversity, organizational, and supplier diversity data
of local governments. This survey was distributed with the assistance of NIGP: The
Institute for Public Procurement (NIGP). NIGP is the largest professional organization
for public procurement professionals in the United States. Second, the United States
Census Bureau was utilized to obtain data comprising the environmental context outlined
in the study. Third, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Election Data and
Science Lab database provided data on voting outcomes of the 2016 Presidential election.
This captured the political preference of the community.
Surveys were emailed to the chief procurement officer or head of procurement in
local government organizations throughout the United States in November 2018. NIGP
facilitated the survey distribution to its membership. NIGP has approximately 3,000
member agencies. For the present study, the survey was emailed to 1,983 member
agencies that represent local governments. Four hundred thirty-six agencies responded,
yielding a 22% response rate. Following Prier et al. (2016), cases with missing values
were excluded in efforts to be more conservative with conclusions drawn from this
analysis. This resulted in 187 usable cases.
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This study utilized one dependent variable. This variable is an additive index
referred to as Supplier Diversity Activity Index. This is a count variable reflecting the
number of supplier diversity activities in which an organization engages. The index
includes 11 activities.
The independent variables were grouped into three categories: individual,
organizational, and environmental. The main independent variables examined gender and
racial/ethnic diversity of elected officials, city managers/CEOs, and procurement heads.
Organizational and environmental variables are control variables. The organizational
variables include discretion of procurement staff, dedicated staff for supplier diversity,
and number of full-time employees in the organization. The environmental context
includes legal/compliance factors as well as community characteristics. Both are present
in the contracting environment and can guide or constrain supplier diversity policy
implementation.
Following the survey, two case studies were conducted: City of Portland (Oregon)
and City of San Antonio (Texas). Case study sites were identified by utilizing a stratified
sampling technique that considered population size, population demographics, and extent
of supplier diversity policy implementation. This technique is further detailed in Chapter
3. These case studies included semi-structured interviews with key representatives from
the local government that are knowledgeable about supplier diversity initiatives of their
respective agency. In addition, key members of the San Antonio community were
interviewed. They were identified and included by the Chief Procurement Officer
because of their unique insight into this subject. The Chief Procurement Officer for the
City of Portland opted to only include representatives from the City government for their
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case study. Semi-structured interviews are beneficial because they allow for direct
interaction and provide an opportunity for follow-up questions immediately following a
response. The semi-structured format also allows for probing questions and deviation
(adding/subtracting questions). The case studies provided additional insight on factors
impacting supplier diversity policy implementation and confirmed certain findings of the
quantitative analysis.
1.7 Outline of Dissertation Chapters
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of representative bureaucracy. First, an
overview of the theory of representative bureaucracy is provided—detailing the types of
representative bureaucracy (i.e., passive, active, and symbolic) and the relationship
between them. Then, a deeper investigation of active representation is provided. This
includes a discussion of the conditions necessary to achieve active representation and
factors that may impact it. Finally, prior research on representative bureaucracy in
contracting is examined, and the conceptual model for this study is introduced.
Chapter 3 summarizes the research methods employed in this study. Data
collection and analysis occurred in two separate phases. First, justification for the choice
in methodology is provided. Second, this chapter lists the research questions and details
the study’s hypotheses. Third, the research design of the quantitative methodology is
described. This includes a discussion on the design of survey instrument,
operationalization and measurement of variables included in the study, sampling, and
survey administration and response rate. Fourth, the process involved in conducting case
studies is explained. This includes site selection, access to the case study sites, semistructured interview process, and qualitative data analysis.
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Chapter 4 presents the results of the quantitative data analysis. This chapter
outlines the operationalization of variables included in this study. Chapter 5 presents the
results of the qualitative data analysis. These findings complement the quantitative results
and provide an in-depth account of factors that impact supplier diversity.
The final chapter, Chapter 6, provides a discussion and conclusions for this study.
Findings from the present study are compared to prior studies to identify implications for
the theory of representative bureaucracy. Moreover, implications for practice are
described. In addition, study limitations are outlined. Finally, recommendations for future
research are provided.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This study builds on the theory of representative bureaucracy to assess the
impacts of organizational representation on the implementation of contracting policy as it
relates to supplier diversity. The research on representative bureaucracy is extensive, but
research on representative bureaucracy in the local government contracting environment
is scarce. This context provides insight into how the theory of representative bureaucracy
applies in a setting that is driven by efficiency and guided by legal stipulations.
First, this chapter explains supplier diversity and different ways in which these
policies are implemented by local governments. Second, an overview of the history of
representative bureaucracy is provided. Definitions of types of representation are
included in this section. An outline of developments, applicability, and implications
across varying policy areas is also provided. Third, the manifestation of representative
bureaucracy in the contracting environment is examined. I then provide a review of
relevant contracting literature and literature specific to representation in contracting.
Fourth, gaps in the literature are identified. Finally, the different factors affecting active
representation are explained, and the research questions, hypotheses, and conceptual
model are presented.
2.2 Supplier Diversity Contracting Initiatives of Local Governments
Supplier diversity refers to contracting policies aiming to enhance access, limit
discrimination, correct historical injustices, and empower traditionally underserved
populations (McCrudden, 2004; Fernandez et al., 2012). These policies encourage
contracting with businesses owned by women, minority groups, and other disadvantaged
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social groups (U.S. Small Business Administration, 2017). The present research focused
on policies promoting contracting with women and minority owned businesses.
Prior research has suggested that there are two main rationales for supplier
diversity: social equity and economic development (Celec, Voich, Nosari, & Stith, 2000;
McCrudden, 2004; Martin et al., 2007; Brammer & Walker, 2011; Fernandez et al., 2012;
Nijaki & Worrel, 2012). Supplier diversity efforts aim to decrease contracting disparities
by redistribution of contracting dollars. This diversifies the vendor pool, instills diversity
in the market, and enhances fairness and access in contracting for small business owners
from disadvantaged groups (Celec et al., 2000; McCrudden, 2004; Brammer & Walker,
2011; Nijaki & Worrel, 2012).
Supplier diversity yields benefits for government agencies and for women and
minority owned businesses. Greater diversity in the market effectively maintains
competitive pricing of goods and services because it drives for-profit businesses to reduce
their costs and increase quality to provide the best value for their product (Rice, 1992;
Selden, 2006; Amirkhanyan, 2010; Terman, 2014; McCue, Prier, & Swanson, 2015).
This may lead to more efficient pricing for government procurement. Contracting with
women and minority owned businesses also provides jobs and generates revenue, helping
to maintain and grow these businesses and benefit their employees.
Local governments have policies and programs that aim to achieve supplier
diversity. These programs are formal and informal initiatives allowing varying degrees of
discretion in their implementation. I reviewed literature and professional reports to
identify common supplier diversity initiatives (Celec et al., 2000; Insight Center for
Community Economic Development, 2007; Martin et al., 2007; Smith & Fernandez,
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2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Terman, 2014; Blount & Hill, 2015; Brunjes & Kellough,
2018). This includes: set asides, price evaluation credits, preference points, setting goals
for contracting with women and minority owned businesses, tracking utilization of these
firms, publishing this utilization, penalizing contractors for fraud, outreach events,
offering or facilitating technical assistance and other developmental opportunities,
formulating large contracts so that parts of the contract may be bid on rather than the
whole, and advertising contracting opportunities in two or more platforms. These
initiatives represent dedication, support, and active efforts by local governments toward
achieving supplier diversity. Each initiative is described in greater detail in the
paragraphs that follow.
Set asides are contracts that are exclusively reserved for groups meeting certain
criteria. Price evaluation credits and preference points provide an adjustment to certain
qualified firms during the bid evaluation process. Setting contracting goals, tracking
utilization, and publishing utilization are part of good faith efforts by local governments
to increase contracting dollars or percentage of contracts being awarded to women and
minority owned businesses.
Local governments penalize contractors for fraud to demonstrate a commitment to
transparency and effectiveness in their supplier diversity programs. Some contractors
attempt to bypass policies and procedures meant to provide opportunities for women and
minority owned businesses in government contracting. In these cases, the fraudulent
contractors use shell companies or obscure company ownership so that it will appear—
and qualify—as women owned or minority owned.
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Outreach events are efforts by the local government to inform women and
minority owned businesses about contracting or other opportunities (e.g., technical
development) available to these groups. On a related note, local governments may offer
or facilitate technical assistance and other developmental opportunities specifically for
women and minority owned businesses. For example, these firms may be qualified to
perform the work under a contract, but they may need guidance on how to produce the
proposal required to bid on such projects. In these cases, the local government may offer
assistance or have an existing partnership with an organization in the community that can
assist.
Another supplier diversity initiative of local governments is to design large
contracts so that smaller businesses can bid on parts of the contract—rather than the
whole. This allows firms with less financial resources and/or capacity to bid on specific
portions of a contract, while allowing larger firms to bid on the entire contract or a
portion that requires greater financial resources and/or capacity.
Finally, local governments are required to advertise contracting opportunities.
However, certain bidding platforms used to manage the advertising and proposal
submission process require a fee. This may deter certain firms from participating. To
remedy this problem, local governments advertise these opportunities on additional
platforms that do not include fees, which expands their reach.
Based on key features of the theory of representative bureaucracy, the present
study examined how diversity of local government leadership impacts implementation of
these initiatives. The following sections provide a literature review of representative
bureaucracy, examine its application to contracting, and identify gaps in the literature.
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The conceptual model based on the literature review is presented in the final section of
this chapter.
2.3 History and Developments of Representative Bureaucracy Theory
The theory of representative bureaucracy posits that bureaucratic actors sharing
demographic characteristics with members of the community are more likely to reflect
the interests of these constituents (Mosher, 1968; Krislov, 1974; Meier, 1993; Meier &
Bohte, 2001; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel &
Loscocco, 2005; Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Riccucci et al., 2015; Bishu & Kennedy,
2019). A representative bureaucracy reconciles “the need for bureaucracy with the
normative requirements of democracy” (Meier, 1993, p. 393), and helps to provide
legitimacy to the decisions and actions of bureaucrats (Meier, 1993; Gade & Wilkins,
2013; Bishu & Kennedy, 2019). A bureaucracy that reflects the same characteristics as
the public provides a way for citizens to be heard in the policy process because citizens
feel linked to their government (Sowa & Selden, 2003). These shared characteristics
constitute shared values and understanding of experiences and needs.
Early notions of representative bureaucracy can be traced to Kingsley (1944).
According to Kingsley (1944), representative bureaucracy should mirror the dominant
groups in society (Meier, 1975). Since this time, there have been several advancements to
the theory of representative bureaucracy. While Kingsley (1944) proposed for
bureaucracy to mirror dominant groups in society, others argued that bureaucrats should
mirror the population they serve (Long, 1952; Van Riper, 1958; Pitkin, 1967). By
mirroring the population, bureaucrats would more likely represent the values and act in
the interest of this population. Mosher (1968) further developed the theory of
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representative bureaucracy, noting the distinction and relationship between passive and
active representation, and formed the foundation for the theory of representative
bureaucracy seen today (Bishu & Kennedy, 2019).
There are three main categories of research on representative bureaucracy:
passive, symbolic, and active (Bishu & Kennedy, 2019). Passive representation occurs
when the demographic characteristics of organizational actors mirror those of the public
they serve (Mosher, 1968; Stein, 1986; Saltzstein, 1989; Stewart, England, & Meier,
1989; Meier, 1993; Riccucci & Saidel, 1997; Weiher, 2000). Demographic characteristics
can consist of race, ethnicity, sex, and education. A recent study by Vinopal (2019) also
incorporated socioeconomic status as a category of representation. Passive representation
research provides varying ways in which to measure representativeness. This includes,
for example, creating an index measuring percent of a demographic group in the work
force divided by percent of the same demographic group in the population; an index
measuring percent of a demographic group at higher levels of an organization divided by
percent of the same demographic group at lower levels of the same organization; and an
index measuring percent of a demographic group in specific categories of jobs divided by
percent of the same demographic group in the total workforce (Riccucci & Saidel, 1997).
Studies on passive representation have mainly focused on factors affecting
representativeness or underrepresentation of different demographic groups in public
agencies (Saltzstein, 1989; Stewart et al., 1989; Riccucci & Saidel, 1997). In some cases,
organizational representation is a function of the available population to fill certain
positions (Stewart et al., 1989). This translates to representation across varying positions.
For example, Stewart el al. (1989) found that more Black residents in a community leads
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to more Black representation in school board positions. Consequently, this led to greater
Black representation in administrator positions, which—in turn—led to greater Black
representation in teaching positions.
In their study on passive representation, Riccucci and Saidel (1997) found that
gender and racial disparities exist when examining representation in top level and career
positions across state agencies. Reconfiguring a measure of representation, Riccucci and
Saidel (1997) found greater disparities than what has been reported in prior studies that
measured overall representation in the agency. Women are often appointed to lead
agencies with gendered goals (e.g., human rights, labor, human resources), but they are
vastly underrepresented in public safety fields (Riccucci & Saidel, 1997). The same trend
applies to race/ethnicity with minorities mainly employed in lower levels in corrections,
utilities, transportation, police, and welfare agencies. These findings speak to the
importance of passive representation for equitable representation.
Active representation occurs when policies and implementation activities of
bureaucrats reflect the interests of constituents with whom they share demographic
characteristics (Mosher, 1968; Meier, 1993; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco,
2005; Bradbury & Kellough, 2008). Shared demographic characteristics between
bureaucrats and constituents impact the values and beliefs of bureaucrats because of
shared experiences and socialization processes. This often results in favorable outcomes
for the represented groups. Research has demonstrated that passive representation can
translate to active representation in different settings (Mosher, 1968; Meier, 1993;
Selden, 1997; Hindera & Young, 1998; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell &
Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005; Smith & Fernandez,
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2010; Fernandez et al., 2012). Determinants of active representation in different settings
are detailed in Section 2.6.
Symbolic representation, another facet of representative bureaucracy theory,
focuses on the symbolic significance of passive representation (Riccucci & Saidel, 1997;
Meier & Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009; Gade & Wilkins,
2013; Riccucci et al., 2015). Symbolic representation is based on perceived legitimacy
that occurs through shared demographics characteristics, identification, and/or
experience. Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, and Licari (2016) noted that when
“bureaucrats share the identification, experience, and characteristics of a portion of the
public, that audience will perceive the actions of those bureaucrats as legitimate, even if
the bureaucrats are not purposefully representing that group” (p. 64). This provides an
avenue for bureaucratic legitimacy without purposeful action by the organization or
bureaucrat.
Symbolic representation focuses on how commonalties between members of the
public and bureaucrats affects the attitudes, behaviors, and actions of the public
(Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009: Gade & Wilkins, 2013; Bishu & Kennedy, 2019).
Recent scholarship has posited that symbolic representation is important for trust,
cooperation, and coproduction (Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009; Gade & Wilkins,
2013; Riccucci et al., 2014; Riccucci et al., 2015). For example, in the case of law
enforcement, police actions by Black police officers were perceived as legitimate by
Black citizens, which mirrored White citizens’ perceptions of White police officers
(Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009). In the case of local recycling, female leadership of
the program increased female citizens’ willingness to cooperate with the agency, leading
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to a relationship of coproduction (Riccucci et al., 2015). Symbolic representation
demonstrates that passive representation, like active representation, can lead to benefits
for the public (Theobald & Haider-Markel, 2009; Gade & Wilkins, 2013; Kennedy, 2013;
Riccucci et al., 2014; Riccucci et al., 2015).
2.4 Representative Bureaucracy in Contracting
Government contracting practices emerged as an important topic in public
administration with the New Public Management (NPM) movement in the 1990s, which
called for public sector reform aimed at achieving efficiency and effectiveness through a
more market-centered approach to public administration (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992;
Frederickson, 1996). The use of alternate public service delivery mechanisms, like
contracting and privatization, were mainly utilized to reduce government waste, improve
public sector productivity, and foster competition (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). While
contracting practices generally reflect the main tenets of NPM (e.g., award contracts to
suppliers that offer the lowest bid), contracting is being utilized more and more as a
strategic tool for governments to achieve policy goals and outcomes that go beyond the
tenets of NPM. Supplier diversity, for example, spans economic, social, political, and
normative justifications. These are policy initiatives often aimed at alleviating disparities
that arise from the contracting process while boosting the local economy.
The present study builds on three major works on representative bureaucracy in
contracting: Smith and Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; and Brunjes and
Kellough, 2018. Prior research on representative bureaucracy has demonstrated that
diversity of key personnel impacts contract awards in federal government agencies
(Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). Smith
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and Fernandez (2010) investigated the impact of a representative bureaucracy on
contracting with minority owned businesses; they found that minority representation at
the senior executive level of federal government agencies increases the number of
contracts awarded to minority owned businesses. Representativeness in leadership
positions shapes priorities of the agency and influences the actions of contracting staff at
the street level (Smith & Fernandez, 2010). Representation at higher levels has a greater
impact in federal agencies than representation at lower levels (Smith & Fernandez, 2010).
Building on Smith and Fernandez (2010), Fernandez et al. (2012) explored
whether minority and gender representation in federal government agencies impact
contracting with minority and women owned businesses, respectively. Fernandez et al.
(2012) found evidence that minority representation in the entire organization and at
senior executive levels is statistically significant in this setting, but gender representation
is not. Minority representation at the senior executive level also increases the number of
contracts dollars awarded to women owned businesses (Fernandez et al., 2012). Gender
representation was assessed at several levels in the federal government agencies and in no
instance were findings significant. Fernandez et al. (2012) offered possible explanations
for this finding, stating that programs emphasizing contracting with minority owned
businesses are more prominent and established than programs aimed to promote the
interests of women owned businesses. Therefore, women in these agencies have
competing programmatic goals and priorities. Fernandez et al. (2012) also noted that
women in federal government agencies may be subjected to organizational socialization
and align their behavior with the goals of the organization or with the majority in the
organization. Furthermore, because federal procurement tends to be male dominated,
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females may fear assuming an advocacy role and showing gender bias to avoid negative
repercussions and maintain a positive image in a male dominated industry.
Brunjes and Kellough (2018) also examined representative bureaucracy in federal
government contracting, but disaggregate races/ethnicities noting varying effects among
specific races/ethnicities. Brunjes and Kellough (2018) demonstrated that minority
representation is statistically significant. Findings are also statistically significant when
groups within the minority category are examined separately. In addition, they found
strong evidence that minority representation in key positions is related to contracting
decisions benefitting minority owned businesses. Specifically, minority representation of
those with direct oversight of contract management has greater influence over contracting
decisions benefitting minority owned firms than representation in other positions of the
organization. Brunjes and Kellough (2018) also accounted for educational attainment of
minorities and their position within the organization. Overall, research on representative
bureaucracy and federal level government contracting has demonstrated the significance
of minority representation, and a negative or insignificant relationship between female
representation and contract awards to female-owned businesses or minority ownedbusinesses (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough,
2018).
Smith and Fernandez (2010) called for exploration of representative bureaucracy
in local government contracting stating that “localities have less formalized procurement
processes and should grant greater bureaucratic discretion and create additional
opportunities for active representation to occur” (p. 94). The present study builds on prior
research (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018)
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and explores the impact of a representative bureaucracy on local government contracting
initiatives aimed to promote contracting with women and minority owned businesses. It
was expected that local governments with more diverse leadership will have a higher
degree of supplier diversity than local governments with less diversity.
2.5 Gaps in Representative Bureaucracy Literature
Bishu and Kennedy (2019) found that representative bureaucracy has been mainly
examined in the following domains: education, law enforcement, housing finance, and
other unspecified policy. Additionally, these studies have only examined either
race/ethnicity or gender. Fewer studies have examined both diversity dimensions. In
addition, the level of bureaucracy assessed in these studies was mostly manager or streetlevel. Few studies have examined multiple levels in the organization. Empirical research
on representative bureaucracy has found that not every circumstance provides the
necessary environment for active representation (Selden, 1997; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell
& Rosenthal, 2003; Fernandez et al., 2012). The theory of representative bureaucracy
applies differently across policy areas, hierarchical level in the bureaucracy, and for
minority and gender representation. Overall, broader “application of representative
bureaucracy theory is needed to better understand its strengths and limitations” (Bishu &
Kennedy, 2019, p.2).
Findings of prior research on representative bureaucracy have been inconsistent
and vary across policy areas. In law enforcement, Wilkins and Williams (2008) found
that racial profiling actually increased with the presence of African American police
officers. In this case, norms and beliefs of the law enforcement profession superseded
individual values. On the other hand, other studies found consistent results demonstrating
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that bureaucratic representation increases benefits to represented groups in the
community in specific fields (Meier, 1993; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell
& Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005; Bradbury &
Kellough, 2008; Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012). These studies found
that active representation occurs in the fields of education (Meier, 1993; Meier & Bohte,
2001; Keiser et al., 2002), agriculture (Sowa & Selden, 2003), congressional committees
(Bell & Rosenthal, 2003), local government administrators in Georgia cities (Bradbury &
Kellough, 2008), state agencies (Saidel & Loscocco, 2005), and federal contracting
(Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012); however, these findings are
contingent on, for example, organizational structures, discretion, and political support,
among other factors.
Differences between findings of prior studies were also present in investigations
of varying hierarchical levels within an organization. Riccucci and Saidel (1997) called
for inclusion of multiple bureaucratic levels, including top ranking leaders for a more
accurate picture of representativeness. Sowa and Selden (2003) acknowledged the
importance of representation at higher levels, noting that administrators “translate vague
legislative mandates into organizational procedures” (p. 700). They can arrange
organizational procedures to benefit represented populations. However, according to
Thompson’s (1976) theory (also supported by Meier, 1993), minorities in higher levels of
an agency have been subjected to more work and time in the agency—leading to their
rise in position and, therefore, decreasing their likelihood of engaging in active
representation. Certain divisions and levels may have a higher degree of organizational
socialization, which can minimize a bureaucrat’s adherence to personal values. In this
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case, the actions of bureaucrats at higher levels in the agency are more reflective of the
agency’s mission and norms. On the other hand, street level bureaucrats, who are mainly
at lower levels in the agency, are more likely to actively represent minority interests.
Furthermore, prior research has found that environments for female and minority
active representation vary. For example, Fernandez et al. (2012) found that minority
representation leads to active representation in federal contracting, but female
representation does not. Keiser et al. (2002) only examined the gender dimension in their
study, but acknowledged that findings may vary when tested against minority
representation.
Research on representative bureaucracy is scarce in the area of local government
contracting policy. This environment is unique because it is a setting driven by efficiency
and guided by legal stipulations. Furthermore, local governments are political institutions
in which policymakers and bureaucrats often need to balance competing priorities and
preferences while being responsive and accountable to the community. In this case, a
representative bureaucracy may critically influence the extent to which implementation of
supplier diversity contracting initiatives and active representation occur. The present
research addresses gaps present in the contracting policy area and includes dimensions of
gender and minority representation and representation at multiple levels in the
organization. Understanding the applicability of representative bureaucracy in local
government contracting has implications for representative bureaucracy theory and also
for contracting practice—where efficiency often trumps equity.
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2.6 Determinants of Active Representation
According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, passive representation
leads to active representation (Mosher, 1968; Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Meier & Bohte,
2001; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005; Smith &
Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012). However, research on representative
bureaucracy has demonstrated that only certain circumstances provide the necessary
environment for active representation to occur, and that circumstances may differ for
female and minority representation (Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Meier & Bohte, 2001;
Keiser et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco,
2005; Bradury & Kellough, 2008). Additionally, research on representative bureaucracy
has focused on the racial and gender dimensions of representation and, in many instances,
minority bureaucrats adopt and implement policies that alleviate disparities faced by
minorities in society (Stein, 1986; Selden, 1997; Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et
al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). On the other hand, previous research on the gender
dimension of representation shows mixed results (Dolan, 2002; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell
& Rosenthal, 2003). Shared demographic characteristics are key components of the
theory of representative bureaucracy and the main explanatory variables for this study;
however, in the following sections, I outline additional conditions that are conducive for
active representation (Saltzstein, 1989; Stewart et al., 1989; Meier, 1993; Riccucci &
Saidel, 1997; Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser et al., 2002;
Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005; Bradbury &
Kellough, 2008; Grissom et al., 2009; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018; Vinopal, 2019).

31

Salience of Demographic Characteristics and Policy Type
Meier (1993) noted that “demographic characteristics should be highly salient”
(Meier, 1993, p. 393-394). Additionally, the type of policy being examined should be
relevant to a specific demographic group. For example, Keiser et al. (2002) indicated that
there are societal issues “defined as women’s issues through the political process” (p.
556). A gendered policy (e.g., childcare) is a policy more relevant to women (Keiser et
al., 2002; Riccucci et al., 2015). In the case of supplier diversity, contracting with women
and minority owned businesses is relevant to specific demographic groups. Additionally,
the demographic characteristic of interest is clearly defined in this case.
Discretion
Several facets of discretion must be considered in this context. While it does not
guarantee it, discretion makes active representation possible (Meier & Bohte, 2001).
Bureaucrats have discretion to act where organizational rules are unable to cover
contingencies and various situations. For representative bureaucracy, this means that
active representation is more likely to occur in an environment where bureaucrats have
some decision-making authority in how their job is carried out (Meier, 1993; Meier &
Bohte, 2001; Keiser et al., 2002; Sowa & Selden, 2003). Bureaucrats are able to rectify
deficiencies of elected officials partly through the discretion they have to implement
policies (Sowa & Selden, 2003). The assumption is that shared characteristics,
experiences, values, attitudes, and beliefs of bureaucrats will translate to decisions and
actions that benefit represented groups through discretionary activities.
Bureaucratic discretion can occur at various levels in the organization (Meier,
1993; Sowa & Selden, 2003). At higher levels in the organization, Sowa and Selden
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(2003) noted that administrators “translate vague legislative mandates into organizational
procedures” (p. 700). At these levels, however, organizational socialization is more
prevalent, and administrators may adhere more to the agency mission than their personal
values (Meier, 1993). On the other hand, street level bureaucrats often make decisions
related to service provision on a daily basis (Sowa & Selden, 2003). They have exposure
and interaction with the represented population. According to Meier (1993), street level
bureaucrats are better positioned to advocate and act on behalf of constituents because of
less exposure to organizational socialization. Street level bureaucrats tend to be further
from the higher echelons of an organization and have less tenure in the organization
(Meier, 1993). Therefore, they are more likely to strongly relate and maintain attitudes
reflective of their demographic origins and advocate on behalf of constituents with
backgrounds that are similar to their own (Meier, 1993).
Studies on bureaucratic discretion have found that organizations with
environments that allow discretion produce better outcomes for represented groups
(Meier & Bohte, 2001; Sowa & Selden, 2003). Meier and Bohte (2001) found that
minority students performed better when organizational structures of schools in Texas
promoted discretion of minority teachers. In their study on representative bureaucracy in
the Department of Agriculture’s Farmer’s Home Administration, Sowa and Selden
(2003) examined the direct effect of discretion on active representation, and they found
that administrators who have discretion are more likely to act in ways that represent
minority interests. Brunjes and Kellough (2018) noted that even though the contracting
environment is subject to rules and regulations, contracting officials still maintain
discretion in various aspects of their jobs (e.g., setting specifications of products and

33

services, establishing bid and evaluation criteria, contractor selection and oversight).
Procurement officials at the street level have “substantive expertise on the type of work to
be performed in the contract and familiarity with the contracting processes and
contractors” (p. 521). Therefore, those involved in the contracting process can impact
decisions regarding contracting initiatives and contracted firms.
While discretion of the procurement head is not directly measured in the present
study, the assumption is that discretion is available in the case of supplier diversity. This
assumption was based on similar assumptions in studies by Smith and Fernandez (2010),
Fernandez et al. (2012), and Brunjes and Kellough (2018). Several programmatic
initiatives (see Section 2.2) provide leeway in implementation and provide an
organizational structure that promotes discretion.
Representative Role
Related to shared demographic characteristics and discretion, an administrator
assuming a representative role can impact whether passive representation translates into
active representation (Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa &
Selden, 2003). The representative role “refers to the willingness of bureaucrats to see
themselves as advocates for, or representatives of” minority or gender interests (Bradbury
& Kellough, 2008, p. 698). Individuals who hold positions in which they are expected to
be the voice and act on behalf of specific groups are more likely to adopt the
representative role (Sowa & Selden, 2003).
Political and Executive Support
Studies have found that political representation often impacts passive
representation at other levels in the organization (Saltzstein, 1989; Stewart et al., 1989;
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Meier, 1993; Riccucci & Saidel, 1997). In the case of urban school districts, district
elections with a high level of Black population promoted Black representation on school
boards (Stewart et al., 1989). This led to an increase in Black school administrators,
which subsequently led to an increase in Black teachers (Stewart et al., 1989). Findings
follow a similar pattern in law enforcement (Saltzstein, 1989), generalized studies on
schools across the nation (Polinard, Wrinkle, & Longoria, 1990; Meier, 1993), and
federal agencies (Kellough, 1990).
While political representation is important for passive representation, Meier
(1993) noted the significance of political support. Political support facilitates active
representation (Meier, 1993). Saidel and Loscocco (2005) noted that the dynamics in the
political realm are different than appointed levels in the organization. Elected officials
often face competing pressures and they are held accountable by voters (Saidel &
Loscocco, 2005). These top-level decision-makers are able to set priorities and provide
continuing support to existing operations (Saidel & Loscocco, 2005). For representative
bureaucracy, this means that these decision-makers will support issues that they can
relate to through their demographic characteristics, shared values, experiences, and issues
relevant to their gender or race/ethnicity (Saidel & Loscocco, 2005). In an investigation
of state agency leaders and representative bureaucracy, Saidel and Loscocco (2005)
found that women were nearly twice as likely as men to prioritize issues relevant to the
advancement of women. At the department head level, 50% of women set policy
priorities intended to promote female interests compared to 35% of male department
heads. Overall, Saidel and Loscocco (2005) found that a “substantial proportion of
women appointees are both ‘standing for’ (passive representative bureaucracy) and
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interested in ‘acting for’ (active representative bureaucracy) women in the general
population” (p. 166).
The theory of representative bureaucracy is specific to the bureaucratic levels in
government organizations. However, studies have demonstrated the importance of
political representation and political support for policy implementation (Saltzstein, 1989;
Stewart et al., 1989; Meier, 1993; Riccucci & Saidel, 1997; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005).
An analysis of representativeness of elected officials was included in the present study
because representation and commitment at the highest levels of decision-making impacts
the priorities of the organization.
Organizational/Institutional Context and the Contracting Environment
Contextual factors play a role in the extent to which active representation occurs
(Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden,
2003; Grissom et al., 2009; Krause et al., 2016; Vinopal, 2019). In this section, I discuss
organizational and the institutional context in which supplier diversity operates. The
contracting environment is of particular interest due to the nature of supplier diversity.
Two components central to contracting are public law and organizational
structures (Brown et al., 2006). Public laws and organizational structures dictate the tools
and resources available to bureaucrats in contracting processes (Brown et al., 2006).
Keiser et al. (2002) noted that bureaucrats are “shaped and constrained by the
contingencies of context and circumstance” (p. 555). Furthermore, “institutional
structures help to determine the purpose and scope of bureaucrats’ work and how much
discretion they have carrying out their tasks” (Kieser et al., 2002, p. 555).
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In the contracting environment, these mechanisms of control may limit the ability
of organizational actors to act on behalf of constituents. Contracting policies are
particularly subjected to institutional influence in the local government setting where
policy decisions and actions are mandated by legislation and subject to legal oversight
(Sowa & Selden, 2003; Martin et al., 2007). Public law sets operational boundaries
outlining what is permitted, authorized, and required in the contracting process (Brown et
al., 2006). Additionally, contracting decisions may also be routinized and restricted by
organizational rules and regulations so that discretion in certain roles is minimized
(Meier, 1993).
On one hand, studies have noted that where law is involved, discretion necessary
for active representation to occur may not be available because managers are bound by
rules and regulations (Meier, 1993; Meier & Bohte, 2001). “As the law establishes what
is authorized and prohibited, it also defines a manager’s zone of discretion, either through
legal ambiguity or direct delegation” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 325). On the other hand,
Brunjes and Kellough (2018) noted that staff who work within the contracting
environment still have discretion where the law and policy do not specifically guide
actions to be taken. This can require public managers to make value-laden decisions at
their discretion, including: defining the scope of work and specifications, establishing
contractor qualifications, bid evaluation, contractor selection, defining renewal
provisions, and specifying incentives, and outlining compliance requirements, and
program implementation (Brown et al., 2006; Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Brunjes &
Kellough, 2018).
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Local government may enact their own policies restricting or facilitating
implementation of supplier diversity or these policies can be driven by federal and state
requirements as well (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Blount & Hill,
2015). For example, in the case of federal and state requirements, funding can be used as
an incentive for compliance by local governments. Because the present research
examined representative bureaucracy in the contracting environment, the institutional
context of local government organizations was included in the theoretical framework.
While public law and organizational structures guide or constrain contract policy
implementation, previous research on contracting out has found that contracting decisions
are often political (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al.,
2016). Local government agencies are often responsive to the demands of their residents
and the well-being of their community (Boyne, 1998; Wang, Van Wart, & Lebredo,
2014). Because local governments are political systems charged with balancing priorities
of stakeholders, citizen political ideology and pressures from interest groups in the
community can drive decisions and preferences of organizational actors (Boyne, 1998;
Brudney et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2016; Alkadry et al., 2019). In the
case of supplier diversity, citizens or interest groups promoting contracting with women
or minority owned businesses may seek to shape priorities of policymakers to align with
their position. In this environment, public managers must consider stakeholder
preferences and weigh values like equity and efficiency (Brown et al., 2006).
The environment in which the local government operates can also impact
contracting decisions. Certain population characteristics may favor or constrain the
contracting environment and, therefore, impact supplier diversity. This includes factors
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such as citizens’ preferences/ideology, population subgroups, population incomes, and
population size (Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005; Krause et al.,
2016).
Boyne (1998) included the average income of the population, poverty, and
measures for disadvantaged populations in order to measure public preferences. On one
hand, populations with higher incomes support contracting out because these groups
often demand higher quality services of which contractors are better equipped to supply
(Ferris & Graddy, 1986). On the other hand, contracting out may lead to cost savings and
lower operational costs for governments, which can result in reduced spending (Ferris &
Graddy, 1986). This may be the best option for poorer cities unable to collect adequate
tax revenue to support these functions internally (Ferris & Graddy, 1986). Another
assumption is that certain groups prefer a larger role for their local government (Brudney
et al., 2005). Specifically, populations in poverty and/or racially/ethnically disadvantaged
groups generally favor direct service provision from their local government (Boyne,
1998).
Brudney et al. (2005) noted that larger populations may lead to increases in
services required of their government. Due to capacity, contracting out may be the
necessary solution for local governments to provide services effectively to their
community. Cities with larger populations are also related to larger local government
organizations with a greater capacity to focus exclusively on efforts related to supplier
diversity (Krause et al., 2016).
Finally, sufficient organizational capacity will ensure that organizations have
personnel—equipped with knowledge, experience, and understanding of supplier
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diversity efforts—who are dedicated to contracting tasks (e.g., formulating contracts,
coordinating services, negotiating with contractors, managing contract performance, and
implementing related programs) (Brown et al., 2006). Organizations with human capital
dedicated to contracting can effectively manage and implement contract related tasks and
minimize failed contracts (Brown et al., 2006). Organizations with greater commitment to
supplier diversity are also more likely to have a dedicated unit to implement related
programs (Krause et al., 2016). This enhances human capital available for supplier
diversity policy implementation.
2.7 Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Conceptual Model
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between organizational
representativeness and contract policy implementation by assessment of supplier
diversity of local governments in the United States. The research questions for this study
are:
1) What factors impact supplier diversity policy implementation of local
governments?
2) Does decision-maker diversity play a role in supplier diversity policy
implementation?
Explanatory Variables
Based on the theory of representative bureaucracy, the main explanatory variables
in the model for this research are demographic characteristics. Minority status and gender
of elected officials, city managers/CEOs, and procurement heads were captured for this
measure. It was expected that agencies with more diversity at the elected official, city
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manager/CEO, and procurement head level would more actively implement supplier
diversity policies.
Hypothesis 1: Local governments with more diverse leadership will have a
higher degree of supplier diversity than local governments with less diversity.
The second research question was guided by Thompson’s (1976) theory, supported by
subsequent works (Meier, 1993; Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012;
Brunjes & Kellough, 2018), which found that active representation is more likely to
occur at levels closer to the actions on the ground (street level). The present study
examined three main levels in the organization: elected officials, city managers/CEOs,
and procurement heads. Although procurement heads are mainly at the top of their
departments, they are viewed as street level bureaucrats in the present study. Procurement
heads are often involved in setting departmental priorities, establishing how policies will
be implemented, potentially interact with contractors, and have considerable discretion in
evaluation and contract award decisions. While research has demonstrated the importance
of political representation and support for facilitating active representation (Saltzstein,
1989; Stewart et al., 1989; Meier, 1993; Riccucci & Saidel, 1997; Saidel & Loscocco,
2005), street level representation is posited to have a greater impact than diversity
presented at higher levels. Based on this, I developed the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Local governments with more diversity at the procurement head
level are more likely to actively implement supplier diversity than those with
diversity at other leadership levels.
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Control Variables
To determine how diversity at the level of elected official, city manager/CEO, and
procurement head can impact degree of supplier diversity implementation, control
variables were included—which accounted for factors in the organizational, institutional,
and contracting environment. Previous literature identified three main components central
to local government contracting: (1) public law (Keiser et al., 2002; Martin et al., 2007;
Brown, et al., 2006); (2) organizational structures (Meier, 1993; Keiser et al., 2002; Sowa
& Selden, 2003; Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2016); and, (3) responsiveness to the
needs and preferences of citizens and the community (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005;
Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2016). Public laws and organizational structures
determine the purpose, scope of work, discretion, and resources that bureaucrats have in
performing their duties (Keiser et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2006). Additionally, local
governments have direct interaction and responsibility to their community. They are also
expected to be responsive to the needs of the community and represent stakeholder
values.
Conceptual Model
The conceptual model for this study is illustrated in Figure 1 below. Two aspects
of representative bureaucracy are of particular interest: passive representation and street
level representation. First, passive representation was captured by examining the minority
status and gender of elected officials, city managers/CEOs, and procurement heads.
Based on the literature review, I expected that local governments with more diverse
leadership would have a higher degree of supplier diversity than local governments with
less diversity (Hypothesis 1). Second, because the procurement head position has the
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most direct interaction with the contracting process and with contractors, I expected that
local governments with more diversity at the procurement head level would be more
likely to actively implement supplier diversity than those with diversity at other
leadership levels (Hypothesis 2). These are the explanatory variables for the model. Due
to the political nature and organizational and institutional factors involved in local
government contracting, I included the organizational context, external stakeholder
environment, and legal context in the model as control variables.
Figure 1. Conceptual Model
Demographic
(Elected Officials, City
Manager/CEO, Procurement Head)

• Gender
• Minority status

Organizational

• Capacity
• Staff discretion

External Stakeholder Environment

Legal Context

Associated with active
implementation of
supplier diversity

• Interest groups
• Political ideology
• Population characteristics
• Local ordinance
• Higher level funding
requirement
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
3.1 Introduction
This research utilized mixed methodology to examine the relationship between
decisionmaker diversity and the implementation of supplier diversity programs in local
governments in the United States. In order to answer both research questions
comprehensively, data collection was conducted in two phases. Phase I consisted of data
collection via a survey instrument—distributed to procurement officials in local
government agencies nationwide—and use of secondary data from the United States
Census Bureau and MIT Election Data and Science Lab. Phase II consisted of two case
studies of local governments: City of Portland (Oregon) and City of San Antonio (Texas).
This chapter details the rationale for quantitative and qualitative methods employed in
this research and describes the research design for each method.
3.2 The Mixed Methods Approach
Johnson et al. (2007) noted that combined data collected through quantitative and
qualitative techniques provide a deeper and more meaningful understanding of the
research topic. In the present study, the survey instrument was used to “obtain a
representative sample, with the goal of enhancing the generalizability of qualitative
findings” (Hesse-Biber, 2010, p. 265). The case study sites were a subsample of the
quantitative study sample. This approach directly links both studies. Hesse-Biber (2010)
further noted that linking quantitative and qualitative studies through mixed methodology
can validate and enhance the reliability of findings. The mixed methods approach utilized
in this study is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Mixed Methods Design (Adapted from Hesse-Biber, 2010)

Comparing findings of the two methods helps researchers find convergence or
contradictions in the data and provides a better overall picture of the research topic.
Mixed methodology can help triangulate findings between the two approaches (HesseBiber, 2010). Examining whether the conclusions of the case studies agree with findings
of quantitative analysis aids in validation of the research findings. Overall, mixed
methodology contributed to the theoretical understanding of a representative bureaucracy
in supplier diversity policy implementation.
3.3 Phase I: Quantitative Research
Phase I of this study consisted of quantitative research. This analysis aimed to answer
both research questions below.
1) What factors impact supplier diversity policy implementation of local
governments?
2) Does decision-maker diversity play a role in supplier diversity policy
implementation?
3.3.1 Unit of Analysis
Representative bureaucracy and contracting have been examined in federal
government agencies, but research in this area has been scarce in the context of local
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governments. The unit of analysis for the present research is local government agencies
in the United States. These agencies are subject to pressures from public law and operate
within similar organizational structures and contracting environments. Analysis in this
setting provided important insight on supplier diversity.
3.3.2 Sources of Data and Survey Design
The data for this research were obtained from various sources and analyzed to
determine the relationship between decision maker diversity and supplier diversity
implementation in local government agencies. A national survey of local government
agencies was used to collect data on individual and organizational level data. Survey
questions were informed by the literature review. Prior to distribution, the survey was
pre-tested by six procurement professionals in the United States representing agencies in
Florida, Oregon, Virginia, Ohio, and New York. Survey questions were revised based on
feedback obtained.
The survey was distributed nationally in 2018. It consisted of Yes/No and Likerttype scale questions. The items queried: supplier diversity activities taking place; the
demographic composition of elected officials, city managers/CEOs, and procurement
heads; pressures to implement supplier diversity; and organizational characteristics.
The target population for this study was procurement officials of local
government agencies. The sample of agencies for this research was obtained from NIGP
membership. NIGP is the largest public procurement professional organization—with
approximately 3,000 member agencies in the United States, Canada, and outside of North
America (NIGP, 2019).
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Two main assumptions exist regarding the sample. First, a comprehensive list of
all procurement practitioners does not exist; however, because NIGP is the largest
professional association for procurement professionals in the United States, it is expected
that NIGP membership reflects appropriate cases for this research. Another assumption of
the sample was that respondents were agency representatives most familiar supplier
diversity policies and implementation of these policies, and respondents were also
knowledgeable about specific characteristics of their agency. Therefore, NIGP
membership was the most appropriate population for this study.
The survey was emailed by NIGP to 1,983 local government member agencies
nationwide. Four hundred thirty-six agencies responded to the survey—yielding a 22%
response rate. Following Prier et al. (2016), data with missing values were dropped for a
more conservative interpretation of results. In total, data collection yielded 187 usable
cases (N=187) for the overall analysis.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the sample by U.S. Census Bureau Divisions.
All census divisions are represented in the sample. The majority of responding agencies
represent the South Atlantic (36%), Mountain (15%), and Pacific and East North Central
(both 11%) regions.
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Figure 3. Sample Distribution by U.S. Census Bureau Divisions
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Data were also obtained from the United States Census Bureau and MIT Election
Data and Science Lab. United States Census Bureau was utilized to obtain data on
community characteristics such as population, affluence, and demographics. MIT
Election Data and Science Lab was utilized to gather data on 2016 presidential election
results by county.
3.3.3 Quantitative Data Analysis
The data analysis was conducted using Stata 15 statistical software. The
dependent variable in the model is an additive index labeled Supplier Diversity
Activities. This is a count variable reflecting the number of supplier diversity activities in
which a local government organization engages. Respondents indicated local government
engagement in up to 11 supplier diversity activities: set asides, price evaluation credit,
preference points, establishment of contracting goals, track utilization, publish utilization,
penalize contractors for fraud, outreach events, technical assistance and other
development opportunities, formulate large contracts so that parts may be bid on rather
than the whole, advertise contracting opportunities in two or more platforms.
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Count data typically have a Poisson distribution. An assumption of Poisson
distributions is that the mean and variance are equal. When Poisson regression analysis
was conducted, the mean was 3.871658 and the variance was 8.381289. The variance is
nearly twice the mean, which signifies overdispersion. To address this limitation of
Poisson, negative binomial regression were utilized for quantitative data analysis (Zeileis,
Kleiber, & Jackman, 2008). Results of the negative binomial regression are detailed in
Chapter 4.
3.4 Phase II: Qualitative Research
Phase II of this research includes case studies. The purpose of a case study is to
conduct an in-depth investigation of a “single unit with an aim to generalize across a
larger set of similar units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 341). The case study approach provides the
opportunity to understand how study participants perceive themselves, their roles, and
interact with their environment (Hesse-Biber, 2010). It also helps the researcher gain
insight into participants’ social reality.
In the present research, two case studies were conducted to determine whether
and how representativeness of local government decision-makers affects the
implementation of contracting policies by assessing the degree of supplier diversity of
local governments. The case studies complement the quantitative data collection. It was
expected that findings would emerge from the stories and lived experiences of study
participants.
The two case studies were conducted to identify what is unique about these cases,
but also to identify the general aspects about them (Gerring, 2004). This serves as a basis
for comparison across organizations and aids in description of how representative
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bureaucracy manifests in different organizations. Both case studies reflect variation on
the dimensions relevant to the theory of representative bureaucracy and provide a greater
understanding of supplier diversity.
There are several benefits of case studies. First, the benefit of the case study is
that it provides “depth of analysis,” which means that it contains rich details aiding in a
more complete understanding of the phenomena being studied (Gerring, 2004, p. 348).
Supplier diversity can be a sensitive topic because it is a policy established to address
discriminatory contracting practices, and some aspects are difficult to capture through a
survey. Due to the unique history of each city, variation in local government programs
related to supplier diversity, and the complexity of the contracting environment, the case
study approach was beneficial for obtaining different perspectives on the topic. Second, it
is useful for identifying casual mechanisms through process-tracing and pattern-matching
activities (Gering, 2004). While causation cannot be established, causal mechanisms (i.e.,
what connects individual level factors to active supplier diversity implementation) can be
identified. Third, some have argued that case studies contain a small N. However, this is
not the situation in the present study. One case study contains multiple units, which
results in multiple observations per case study. This provides support for conclusions
drawn.
3.4.1 Site Selection
The case study sites were identified by utilizing a stratified sampling technique in
combination with purposive sampling from the sample utilized for the quantitative
analysis. This sampling technique considered population size, population demographics,
supplier diversity activity participation, and extent of implementation. First, 30 cities with
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the highest populations were identified using data from the United States Census Bureau
“2017 Population Estimates-Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for
Incorporated Places of 50,000 or More” (United States Census Bureau, 2017). Then,
demographic information was obtained for these cities from the United States Census
Bureau Community Facts data search (United States Census Bureau, 2010). These cities
were then ranked by demographic data, which is categorized into Minority and
Nonminority groupings. The Minority group consists African Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Alaska Native, Indian Tribes, Native Hawaiian, Asian
Pacific Americans, and Subcontinent Asian Americans. These groups are recognized by
the United States Small Business Administration as minorities (United States Small
Business Administration, 2017). The top ten Nonminority cities and top ten Minority
cities were identified next. The following step in site selection was to note the supplier
diversity activity index score and minority owned business implementation score that
pertains to the counties of the top ten Nonminority and Minority cities identified. The
supplier diversity activity index score and minority owned business policy
implementation score are measures developed for the quantitative phase of this research
to determine if there is a high degree of supplier diversity. These are measures of formal
and informal supplier diversity policies. Figure 4 illustrates the stratified and purposive
sampling technique utilized to select the case study sites. Site access was requested
starting from the top of each list (Nonminority and Minority cities previously identified).
Further confirmation that the local government agencies selected have a particularly
robust supplier diversity program was obtained through a search on their website and/or
from media coverage on these programs.
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Figure 4. Sampling Technique for Case Study Selection

The cities provide cases where: (1) demographic characteristics of the public are
majority Nonminority and (2) demographic characteristics of the public are majority
Minority (Figure 5). These specific sites were selected because they represent cases with
active implementation. This provided a more in-depth understanding of the intricacies
involved in supplier diversity and helped to identify best practices in supplier diversity
policy implementation. In addition, case studies provide a basis for comparison of the
factors that impact supplier diversity policy implementation in local governments in the
United States. Each case study site is situated in a unique environment/community that is
subject to various influences and challenges. Additionally, the comparison of the two
sites provided an opportunity to gain further insight into how varying components of
representative bureaucracy (e.g., administrative discretion and diversity) play a role in
supplier diversity policy implementation.
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Figure 5. Case Study Selection

Based on the sampling technique, case studies sites were identified. The
Executive Director of NIGP assisted with an email introduction to the head of
procurement of the cities identified. The first Nonminority city contacted, City of
Portland, agreed to the case study immediately. Three Minority cities were contacted to
request permission for a case study. One did not respond and two declined. The City of
Memphis declined for political reasons, and the City of Dallas declined because they
were undergoing a disparity study, which could greatly affect supplier diversity initiatives
in their city. They did not want to provide responses that could change given their
disparity study. The fourth Minority city contacted, City of San Antonio, agreed to
participate in the case study.
In summary, case studies were conducted with the City of Portland and City of
San Antonio. Both represent large cities with over 500,000 people and have an active
supplier diversity program. City of Portland’s population is majority Nonminority.
Whereas, City of San Antonio’s population is majority Minority.
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3.4.2 Qualitative Data Collection
Data collected through case studies included primary and secondary data. Primary
data was collected from interviews with varying City staff and relevant external
stakeholders in the local government agencies serving as case study sites. Because
supplier diversity operates mainly through the Procurement Services Department in the
City of Portland, the Chief Procurement Officer was the point of contact. For the City of
San Antonio, supplier diversity is managed mainly by the Economic Development
Department. The point of contact for the City of San Antonio was the Assistant Director
of Economic Development. The interview questions were provided to each site
approximately one month prior to my arrival. City officials at each site determined who
would be the most knowledgeable about the research topic, and interviews were
scheduled accordingly. Six interviews were conducted at the City of Portland. Thirteen
interviews were conducted at the City of San Antonio. The interviewees at the City of
San Antonio included external stakeholders. Whereas, this option was not provided by
the City of Portland. This accounts for the difference in quantity of interviews at each
site. Additionally, an audit of a Diversity Action Plan meeting at the City of San Antonio
was conducted. This was not previously planned and was an impromptu invitation by the
Assistant Director of the Economic Development Department. There was no comparable
event occurring at the City of Portland during the time of the case study, and there were
no recordings of prior, relevant meetings available for inclusion in the current research.
Interviews were either face-to-face or conducted by phone if the interviewee was
not available to meet in person. The interview questions were semi-structured and
included open ended questions. Twelve main questions were asked. Based on responses
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to the questions, follow-up or probing questions were included. Interview questions are
included in the appendix. The interviews were audio recorded, so that interview content
can be transcribed immediately afterwards and referenced during the data analysis phase
of this research. Interviews occurred in the local government agencies’ premises, except
in the case of one interviewee, who asked to be interviewed offsite at their office. Each
interviewee was provided an informed consent form and guaranteed anonymity.
Secondary data were obtained from respective City websites and documentation
that was provided by interviewees. Data were triangulated with interviews and secondary
data. Interviews with city staff and relevant stakeholders were conducted until saturation
was reached. Saturation occurs when no new details emerge from data collection.
3.4.3 Qualitative Data Analysis
The data collected from interviews was transcribed in its entirety. Any identifying
information was redacted from transcriptions. Then, transcriptions were uploaded into
NVivo 12 software and coded by recurring themes. Secondary data consisted of program
details, background materials to understand the legal context in which supplier diversity
was initiated, policies, and strategic plans. These documents were also uploaded and
coded in NVivo 12. The results of the qualitative data analysis are described in Chapter 5.

55

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH
This chapter outlines results from the quantitative phase of the study. First,
variables included in the model are described and their operationalization is explained.
Then, the results of the negative binomial regression are presented. Finally, I detail the
factors impacting the number of supplier diversity activities in which local governments
engage.
4.1 Operationalization of Variables
The operationalization of the dependent variable, explanatory variables, and
control variables are detailed in the sections below. The dependent variable for this study
is an additive index labeled Supplier Diversity Activity Index. The main independent
variables captured gender and ethnic/racial diversity of elected officials, city
managers/CEOs, and procurement heads of local government agencies. Control variables
in the model captured factors present in the organizational context, external stakeholder
environment, and legal context of local government agencies.
Dependent Variable-Supplier Diversity Activity Index
The dependent variable in the model is an additive index: the Supplier Diversity
Activity Index. Data for this measure were obtained through the survey instrument
described in Chapter 3. To create this index, I used data collected in the quantitative
phase from survey respondents—who were asked to select the supplier diversity activities
in which their organizations engage. A list of 11 items was provided. Each item on this
list carries equal weight because they each represent an effort to support the interests of
women and minority owned businesses. The list was created based on a review of
literature and professional reports, which were used to identify common supplier
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diversity initiatives (Celec et al., 2000; Insight Center for Community Economic
Development, 2007; Martin et al., 2007; Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al.,
2012; Terman, 2014; Blount & Hill, 2015; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018).
The Supplier Diversity Activity Index is a count variable reflecting the number of
supplier diversity activities in which an organization engages. The list included 11 local
government activities: set asides, price evaluation credit, preference points, establishment
of contracting goals, track utilization, publish utilization, penalize contractors for fraud,
outreach events, technical assistance and other development opportunities, formulate
large contracts so that parts may be bid on rather than the whole, advertise contracting
opportunities in two or more platforms. Cronbach alpha was calculated to test the internal
reliability of this measure. The Cronbach alpha is 0.7922, which signifies high internal
reliability.
The distribution of the Supplier Diversity Activity Index is presented in Table 1.
Figure 6 geographically illustrates the variance in supplier diversity activities conducted
by local government agencies included in the study sample.
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Table 1. Distribution for the Supplier Diversity Activity Index (Dependent Variable)
# of Supplier
Diversity Activities
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Frequency

Percent

34
10
24
24
20
19
16
17
12
5
3
3

18.18
5.35
12.83
12.83
10.70
10.16
8.56
9.09
6.42
2.67
1.60
1.60

Figure 6. Variance in Sample-Supplier Diversity Activity Index

Source: 2018 NIGP Survey
Explanatory Variables-Leadership Diversity
Gender and ethnic/racial diversity of organizational leadership are the main
independent variables. Gender and ethnic/racial composition of three organizational
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levels were captured: elected official, city manager/CEO, and procurement head. In the
present study, there are two categories for ethnic/racial composition: minority and
nonminority. Groups within the minority category include Hispanic, African American,
Asian, and Native American. These are categories recognized by the United States Small
Business Administration as socially disadvantaged groups and eligible for certification as
minority-owned or disadvantaged small businesses (United States Small Business
Administration, 2017).
The data for these measures were captured through the survey described in
Chapter 3. The elected official variable was captured through percentage. The survey
respondents were asked to provide the percent of female elected officials in their
organization, and then provide the percent of minority elected officials in their
organization. City manager/CEO and procurement head are dichotomous variables that
were assigned a value of 0 if the individual is male and 1 is the individual is female; a
value of 0 was assigned if the individual is not a minority and 1 was assigned if the
individual is a minority. Survey respondents were asked to select the appropriate
response for their agency.
Figure 7 demonstrates the percent of elected officials, city managers/CEOs, and
procurement heads in the sample that are minority and female. On average, minorities
comprise 23% of elected officials, 19% of city manager/CEO positions, and 21% of
procurement head positions in local government organizations included in this analysis
(Figure 7). On average, females comprise 34% of elected officials, 23% of city
manager/CEO positions, and 51% of procurement head positions in local government
organizations included in this analysis (Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Minority and Female Representation in Local Governments
Minority and Female Representation in Local Governments
(Elected Officials, City Managers/CEOs, Procurement Heads)
Minority

23%
19%
21%
77%
81%
79%

Non-Minority

Female

23%

34%
51%
66%

Male
0%
20%
Elected Officials

49%
40%
City Managers

77%

60%
80%
100%
Procurement Heads

Control Variables
Previous research was reviewed to identify variables that may impact supplier
diversity activity implementation and may be relevant to the contracting environment.
These were grouped into organizational context, external stakeholder environment, and
legal context. These control variables are included in the framework.
The first group of control variables captured the organizational context of contract
implementation. Factors such as organization type, organizational size, organizational
capacity, and discretion of procurement staff were included in this model to account for
the organizational context. Organization type is a categorical variable differentiating
between city/town, county, school system, utility, and special authorities. Organizational
capacity was measured by number of full-time employees (FTEs) in the organization.
Following previous research (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Krause
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et al., 2016), this model included a variable for agencies with designated staff who
exclusively focused on supplier diversity efforts. Based on previous research (Krause et
al., 2016), agencies with dedicated staff for supplier diversity initiatives are likely to
prioritize—and be more active in—supplier diversity efforts. This is a dichotomous
variable, which was assigned a value of 0 for no dedicated staff and a value of 1 for
dedicated staff. Finally, previous research has demonstrated the importance of
bureaucratic discretion for policy implementation that reflects minority interests (Meier,
1993; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser et al., 2002; Sowa & Selden, 2003). It was expected
that those involved in the contracting process can impact the actions related to supplier
diversity initiatives. Bureaucratic discretion of procurement staff was included in this
model for the possible effects stemming from that bureaucratic level. Bureaucratic
discretion is a Likert-type scale measure that examines the extent of discretion (i.e., no
discretion, low discretion, moderate discretion, high discretion, very high discretion) that
procurement staff have over supplier diversity policy implementation.
The second group of control variables captured the environment in which local
government contracting operates. The contracting environment is subject to influence
from various sources external to the organization (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005;
Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2016). Because local governments are political systems
charged with balancing priorities of stakeholders, several factors can drive decisions and
preferences of organizational actors and impact contract implementation (Boyne, 1998;
Brudney et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2016). This includes citizen
political ideology, pressures from interest groups in the community, and community
characteristics requiring government responsiveness. There is evidence that political
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ideology of the population plays a role in engagement in sustainable procurement
(Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2016; Alkadry et
al., 2019). Alkadry et al. (2019) included women-owned and minority-owned business
contracting in their operationalization of sustainable procurement. Political ideology of
the residents was captured through the percent of the population in the respective county
that voted for Clinton in the 2016 presidential election (Alkadry et al., 2019). The model
for this study additionally captured community affluence, population size, population
demographics, and population subgroups that exert pressure on supplier diversity to
account for the contracting environment.
Varying factors in the community can also impact how the local government
agency implements contracting initiatives and balances stakeholder preferences (Ferris &
Graddy, 1986; Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005; Krause et al., 2016). The assumption
was that populations with higher incomes support contracting out because these groups
often demand higher quality services—which contractors are better equipped to supply
(Ferris & Graddy, 1986). On the other hand, populations that include low socioeconomic
status groups and/or racially/ethnically disadvantaged groups generally favor a larger role
and direct service provision from their local government (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al.,
2005). Affluence of the community was included as a control variable in this study and
measured as median household income.
Additional population characteristics included in this study are population count
and population demographics. Brudney et al. (2005) noted that larger populations may
lead to increases in services that the community requires from their government. Due to
capacity, contracting out may be necessary for local governments to effectively provide
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services to their communities. Cities with larger populations are also related to larger
local government organizations with a greater capacity to focus exclusively on efforts
related to supplier diversity (Krause et al., 2016). Population size is a log transformed
count of the total population. Population demographics were measured through percent of
the population that is White Nonminority.
In the case of supplier diversity, citizens or interest groups promoting contracting
with women or minority owned businesses may seek to shape priorities of policymakers
to align with their position. A variable capturing business group pressure was included in
the model to account for external pressures present in the contracting environment that
also steer contracting decisions. This is a Likert-type scale measure capturing the extent
in which business groups exert pressures to engage in supplier diversity. Survey
respondents were asked to rate the influence/pressure from business groups to engage in
supplier diversity (i.e., strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree,
somewhat agree, strongly agree).
Previous research on contracting has demonstrated that the legal context impacts
the extent to which active representation exists (Keiser et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal,
2003; Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018).
According to Keiser et al. (2002), these “structures help to determine the purpose and
scope of the bureaucrats work and how much discretion they have in carrying out their
tasks” (p. 555). Variables capturing the legal context of supplier diversity include
presence of local government ordinance(s) mandating supplier diversity and higher-level
government funding to incentivize supplier diversity. A dichotomous measure, assigned a
value of 0 for no ordinance and 1 for local government ordinance, was included in the
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model to capture whether a local ordinance mandates that agencies implement supplier
diversity activities. In addition to local ordinances, local governments can face pressure
to engage in supplier diversity from federal and state governments. This typically occurs
in the form of compliance as a condition for funding (Smith & Fernandez, 2010;
Fernandez et al., 2012; Blount & Hill, 2015). These factors can impact the prioritization
and effort directed toward supplier diversity by local governments and commonly steer
contract decisions and policies. Higher level funding is a Likert-type scale measure (i.e.,
strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree,
strongly agree) capturing the extent to which funding from higher levels of government
(i.e., federal, state) exerts pressure to engage in supplier diversity.
A summary of the variables included in the model, description, and
operationalization are included in Table 2. Descriptive statistics for these variables are
detailed in Table 3.
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Table 2. Description and Operationalization of Variables
Variable
Type
Dependent
Variable

Variable Name
Supplier Diversity Activity
Index
Elected Officials-Minority

Description and Operationalization
Additive index reflecting the number of supplier
diversity activities a local government agency engages in
Percent of elected officials that are minority

City Manager/CEO-Minority

Dichotomous variable capturing minority status of city
manager/CEO

Survey

Procurement Head-Minority

Dichotomous variable capturing minority status of
procurement head

Survey

Percent of elected officials that are female

Survey

City Manager/CEO-Female

Dichotomous variable capturing gender of city
manager/CEO

Survey

Procurement Head-Female

Survey

City/Town

Dichotomous variable capturing gender of procurement
head
Dichotomous variable capturing the type of local
government agency-City/town

Survey

County Govt

Dichotomous variable capturing the type of local
government agency-County
Dichotomous variable capturing the type of local
government agency-School system

Survey

Main
Explanatory
Variables Elected Officials-Female

Control
Variables

School System

65

Source of Data
Survey
Survey

Survey

Utility

Dichotomous variable capturing the type of local
government agency-Utility

Survey

Special Authority

Dichotomous variable capturing the type of local
government agency-Special authority

Survey

Procurement Staff Discretion

5-point Likert-type scale measure examining the extent
of discretion procurement staff has over supplier
diversity implementation

Survey

Dedicated Supplier Diversity
Staff

Dichotomous variable capturing whether a local
government agency has dedicated staff to implement
supplier diversity

Survey

FTE (log)

Log transformed number of full-time employees in the
local government agency

Survey

Local Ordinance

Dichotomous variable capturing whether a local
ordinance mandates an agency implement supplier
diversity

Survey

Business Group Pressure

5-point Likert-type scale measure capturing the extent to
which business groups exert pressure to engage in
supplier diversity

Survey

Higher Level Funding
Requirement

5-point Likert-type scale measure capturing the extent in
which funding from higher levels of government (i.e.,
federal, state) exert pressure to engage in supplier
diversity
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Survey

Population (log)

Log transformed count of the population

U.S. Census Bureau

White, Nonminority
Population

White, Nonminority population

U.S. Census Bureau

Median Household Income

Median household income

U.S. Census Bureau

2016 Presidential Vote (Pct
Clinton)

Percent of the population that voted for Clinton in the
2016 Presidential election

MIT Election Data
and Science Lab
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Supplier Diversity Index
3.871
Elected Officials-Minority (Pct)
23.518
City Manager/CEO-Minority
0.187
Procurement Head-Minority
0.208
Elected Officials-Female (Pct)
34.133
City Manager/CEO-Female
0.229
Procurement Head-Female
0.508
County Govt*
0.278
School System*
0.176
Utility*
0.032
Special Authority*
0.064
Procurement Staff Discretion
2.267
Dedicated Supplier Diversity Staff
0.144
FTE (log)
6.706
Local Ordinance
0.208
Higher Level Funding Requirement
3.299
Business Group Pressure
2.962
Population (log)
12.89
White, Non-Minority Population
73.775
Median Household Income
61394.92
2016 Pres. Vote (Pct Clinton)
49.797
N=187
*Reference Group: City/Town Govt (Pct 44.39)

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

2.895
26.072
0.391
0.407
24.746
0.421
0.501
0.449
0.382
0.176
0.245
1.245
0.352
1.43
0.407
1.065
1.069
1.301
14.177
16768.62
13.738

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1.098
0
1
1
9.346
27.9
29001
15.017

11
100
1
1
100
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
11.604
1
5
5
16.123
96.4
129588
85.039

4.2 Negative Binomial Regression Results
The dependent variable in this study is a count variable. Count data typically have
a Poisson distribution. The values of the dependent variable are nonnegative values
ranging from 0 to 11. An assumption of a Poisson distribution is that the mean and
variance are equal. In the present study, the mean is 3.871658 and the variance is
8.381289. The variance is more than twice the mean, which signifies overdispersion. To
further confirm overdispersion, a generalized model of Poisson was run in Stata 15
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statistical software to obtain the Pearson’s chi-squared statistic (Hardin & Hilbe, 2014). If
the (1/df) Pearson statistic is greater than 1, there is evidence of overdispersion. In this
case, the (1/df) Pearson statistic is 1.63. To address this violation, a negative binomial
regression model is utilized. In the generalized model for negative binomial regression,
the (1/df) Pearson statistic is 1.13. This illustrates that the negative binomial regression is
a better fit than the Poisson model.
Prior to performing the negative binomial regression, data was checked for
outliers, goodness of fit and robustness checks were conducted. and tests for
multicollinearity were performed. First, outliers were omitted. Then, variables were
examined for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIF) and a correlation
matrix. The VIF for the variables in the model did not exceed 10, which is the common
threshold for multicollinearity (UCLA Institute for Digital Research & Education, 2020).
Correlation between independent variables included in the model was also calculated.
Variables with large correlation coefficients (greater than or equal to .5) were examined
further and removed if appropriate (Remler & Van Ryzin, 2015). This, for example,
resulted in the removal of unemployment rate, which was highly correlated with median
household income. Following previous literature, median household income remained in
the model as a measure of community affluence (Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Boyne, 1998;
Brudney et al., 2005; Krause et al., 2016). Although Percent White, Nonminority was
highly correlated with Percent of the population that voted for Clinton in the 2016
Presidential election (.54), both variables were kept due to the theoretical underpinnings
of these variables for representative bureaucracy (Mosher, 1968; Krislov, 1974; Meier,
1993; Selden, 1997; Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Frederickson et al., 2016) and for
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contracting (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Alkadry et al., 2019).
The correlation matrix for the final model is presented in Table 4.
Survey research can be subject to nonresponse bias. Nonresponse can sometimes
produce bias and result in a sample that may not be representative of the full population.
To assess nonresponse bias, systematic differences between respondents, partial
respondents, and nonrespondents were examined (Prier et al., 2016). These differences
included community characteristics such as population, education, labor force, poverty
rate, unemployment rate, median age, median household income, percent of the
population that is minority and nonminority, and political preference of the population.
Examination of characteristics of nonrespondents, partial respondents, and
respondents showed that the sample utilized for this research has a diverse range and is
representative of NIGP membership. Following the Prier et al. (2016) analysis of
sustainability practices, “non-responses were dropped in order to be conservative with the
data” and to “deflate the concerns over Type I errors” (p. 324). Therefore, there is
confidence in the generalizability of the results.
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix
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This study was also subject to common method bias. Common method bias
occurs when the same survey respondent provides information for measures of the
dependent and independent variables (Jakobsen & Jensen, 2015). This can “inflate
correlations between variables, resulting in biased findings” (George & Pandey, 2017, p.
245). Jakobsen and Jensen (2015) offered solutions for common method bias when
different sources for the dependent and independent variable is not possible. Jakobsen
and Jensen (2015) noted that, when possible, respondents with the expertise to answer
survey questions should be selected. Then, the survey concepts and language should be
clear and concise and query current activities instead of past activities. In addition, asking
questions that would prompt socially desirable responses should be avoided. These points
were addressed during the survey design phase. In addition to addressing possible issues
with common source bias in the survey design phase, supplier diversity policies of a
subsample of agencies surveyed were manually checked to confirm accuracy of survey
responses related to the dependent variable. This check was conducted through the
agencies’ website. Finally, the qualitative components of this study—outlined in Chapter
3—also helped address common method bias.
The results of negative binomial regression are demonstrated in Table 5. To
provide more meaningful results, Table 6 presents the percent of expected change in the
count of supplier diversity activities for variables that are significant.
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Table 5. Negative Binomial Regression Results
Supplier Diversity Activity Index
Elected Officials-Minority (Pct)
City Manager/CEO-Minority
Procurement Head-Minority
Elected Officials-Female (Pct)
City Manager/CEO-Female
Procurement Head-Female
County Govt~
School System~
Utility~
Special Authority~
Procurement Staff Discretion
Dedicated Supplier Diversity Staff
FTE (log)
Local Ordinance
Business Group Pressure
Higher Level Funding Requirement
Population (log)
White, NonMinority Population
Median Household Income
2016 Presidential Vote (Pct Clinton)
_cons
~Reference Group: City/Town Govt
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001
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Coef. Std. Err.
.004**
-.025
.275**
-.003
.074
.081
.226*
-.279*
.096
.142
.104**
.280*
.027
0.112
.061
.123**
.089**
.000
-1.42E-06
.003
-1.272

.002
.142
.126
.002
.124
.106
.119
.162
.282
.231
.039
.154
.040
0.131
.049
.052
.044
.004
3.25E-06
.005
.766

Table 6. Percent of Expected Change
Variables

IRR

Elected Officials-Minority (Pct)
City Manager/CEO-Minority
Procurement Head-Minority
Elected Officials-Female (Pct)
City Manager/CEO-Female
Procurement Head-Female
County Govt~
School System~
Utility~
Special Authority~
Procurement Staff Discretion
Dedicated Supplier Diversity Staff
FTE (log)
Local Ordinance
Business Group Pressure
Higher Level Funding Requirement
Population (log)
White, NonMinority Population
Median Household Income
2016 Presidential Vote (Pct Clinton)
~Reference Group: City/Town Govt
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001

%
Change

1.004**

0%

1.317**

32%

1.254*
0.756*

25%
-25%

1.110**
1.323*

11%
32%

1.131**
1.093**

13%
9%

Negative binomial regression was utilized to analyze the effects of the
independent variables in the model on number of supplier diversity activities in which
local governments engage. Because negative binomial regression mainly provides
relationship direction between the independent variables and the dependent variable and
significance for the relationship, the percent of expected change was calculated to
provide a more specific interpretation of the results. The main predictors in the model are
minority and gender representation variables. The control variables captured the
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organizational, external stakeholder environment, and legal context in which local
government agencies operate.
Results from analyses of representation variables are discussed first. Gender
representation is not statistically significant at any decision-making level included in the
analysis; however, the model does demonstrate a negative relationship between female
representation at the elected official level and supplier diversity activities. This nearly
mirrors the findings of prior research on representative bureaucracy in contracting at the
federal level (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough,
2018). Although not statistically significant in the current model, prior research has
generally produced statistically significant findings demonstrating that female
representation at the senior executive level and/or department head level has no effect on
minority-owned business contracting and negative effects on female-owned business
contracting (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough,
2018). Fernandez et al. (2012) offered possible explanations for the null findings for
gender representation, which may also apply in the local government setting. Programs
benefitting minority-owned businesses are more established than those for women-owned
businesses. Additionally, programs for minority-owned businesses have been more
consistently supported and prioritized than those for women-owned businesses. For
example, women-owned business programs were not prioritized by the George W. Bush
administration, which withdrew a proposed rule addressing the federal government’s
women-owned business program. However, the Obama administration did address this
and bring the women-owned business program into compliance with the Small Business
Reauthorization Act of 2000 (Fernandez et al., 2012). Another possible explanation may
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come from self-categorization theory—where group members align their behavior with
the majority to avoid possible conflict and the appearance of bias (Fernandez et al.,
2012). The organizational levels analyzed in this model have been historically dominated
by males. In the case of elected officials and city managers/CEOs, males still dominate
these positions (Figure 7).
On average, results demonstrate that minority representation at the procurement
head level is statistically significant (p<.05) and has a positive relationship with the count
of supplier diversity activities taking place when holding all other variables constant.
More specifically, minority representation at the procurement head level is associated to a
32% increase in supplier diversity activities (Table 6). Additionally, minority
representation at the elected official level is statistically significant (p<.05) and has a
positive relationship with supplier diversity activities. However, it is not related to a
significant increase in the count of supplier diversity activities (0%) (Table 6). This result
is impressive given that minorities only make up 21% of procurement heads and 23% of
elected officials.
Next, the results of control variables are discussed. Results demonstrate that
county governments and school systems are significantly different in the number of
supplier diversity activities in which they participate (p<.10). County governments are
associated with a 25% increase in count of supplier diversity activities in comparison to
city/town governments (p<.10). School systems, however, are associated with a 25%
decrease in count of supplier diversity activities when compared against city/town
governments (p<.10). Bureaucratic discretion of procurement staff to implement supplier
diversity is also significant (p<.05) and is related to an 11% increase in number of
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supplier diversity activities. The results demonstrate that dedicating staff to supplier
diversity is significant (p<.10) and is related to a 32% increase in count of supplier
diversity activities. Funding from higher level government as a condition of compliance
with supplier diversity is significant (p<.05) and is related to a 13% increase in supplier
diversity activities. Finally, the size of the population is significant (p<.05) and related to
a 9% increase in count of supplier diversity activities.
4.3 Factors Impacting Supplier Diversity
Supplier diversity is a contracting policy at the intersection of efficiency and
social equity. The theory of representative bureaucracy offers a way to balance these two
values. Representative bureaucracy theory posits that bureaucrats that share demographic
characteristics with constituents are more likely to adopt and implement policies that
reflect the interests of those constituents (Mosher, 1968; Krislov, 1974; Selden, 1997;
Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Frederickson et al., 2016). This research aimed to identify
the factors that impact supplier diversity policy implementation of local governments
and, more specifically, aimed to explore whether decision-maker diversity plays a role in
supplier diversity policy implementation. The findings are described below in greater
detail.
Minority Representation
Results of this study demonstrate the importance of minority representation for
active implementation of supplier diversity (as measured by count of supplier diversity
activities taking place). Minority representation is particularly important at the
procurement head level, where it relates to a 32% increase in count of supplier diversity
activities. This is similar to results yielded by previous research on the impact of
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representation on federal contracting of minority-owned and women-owned businesses
(Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018).
Minority representation at the elected official levels is also significant, but has a
greater impact at the procurement head level. While minority representation at the elected
official level is statistically significant, it is not associated with an increased count in
supplier diversity activities. Similar to the findings of Saidel and Loscocco (2015), the
present findings may indicate that top-level decision-makers are able to set priorities and
provide continuing support to existing operations.
These findings support the hypotheses presented in this dissertation. The results of
the quantitative phase of this research finds that local governments with more diverse
leadership have a higher degree of supplier diversity than local governments with less
diversity (Hypothesis 1). Additionally, local governments with more diversity at the
procurement head level are more likely to actively implement supplier diversity than
those with diversity at other leadership levels (Hypothesis 2).
Discretion of the Procurement Staff
In addition to minority representation at the elected official and procurement head
level, there is evidence that the institutional and organizational context in which an
organization operates can impact the extent to which supplier diversity is implemented.
Bureaucratic discretion of procurement staff is statistically significant and related to an
increase of 11% in supplier diversity activities of local government agencies. The
analysis in this study is limited to the levels of elected official, city manager/CEO, and
procurement head; however, the statistically significant finding relating to bureaucratic
discretion of procurement staff indicates that, within an organization, those with more
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direct engagement in supplier diversity (i.e., procurement staff) play an important role in
implementation activities.
Because demographic characteristics for procurement staff were not captured in
this study, it is unclear whether the impact of discretion on supplier diversity is explained
by the theory of representative bureaucracy or related to the expertise required in the
contracting process. For example, Brunjes and Kellough (2018) noted that even though
the contracting environment is subject to rules and regulations, contracting officials still
maintain discretion in various aspects of their jobs. Procurement officials at the street
level have “substantive expertise on the type of work to be performed in the contract and
familiarity with the contracting processes and contractors” (Brunjes & Kellough, 2018, p.
521). Procurement officials are often relied on to use discretion when performing their
jobs and applying rules, standards, and best practices where applicable. This discretion
can impact implementation of contracting initiatives.
Dedicated Supplier Diversity Staff
The findings of this study demonstrate that dedicating staff to supplier diversity
implementation is related to an increase of 32% in the number of supplier diversity
activities in which an organization engages. Dedicated staff represents a priority and
commitment to the related task (Krause et al., 2016). In this case, it represents a greater
commitment to supplier diversity. In addition, prior research has found that investment in
human capital for contracting efforts is related to effective management and
implementation of contract related tasks (Brown et al., 2006).
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Fiscal Federalism
The findings of this research demonstrate that higher-level governments (i.e.,
federal and state) hold some power over the number of supplier diversity activities of
local governments. Local governments operate in a different environment than higher
level governments. They are subject to pressures from the community in which they
operate, as well as state and federal governments, which may influence policies of local
governments. Fiscal federalism may influence local government activities as a condition
of funding or through mandates (Peterson, 1995). For example, this is common in
transportation projects requiring state funding or emergency relief reimbursements from
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (United States Department of Homeland
Security, 2019). The results of the quantitative analysis demonstrate this may also apply
in the case of supplier diversity.
Population Size
The findings of this study demonstrate that population size is statistically
significant and related to a 9% increase in the number of supplier diversity activities in
which a local government agency engages. Contracting literature has noted that cities
with larger populations may lead to an increase in services that the community required
from their government (Brudney et al., 2005). Contracting out may be the necessary
solution for local governments to effectively provide services to their community.
Supplier diversity activities can be advantageous for an agency that contracts out
frequently because it promotes the participation of more vendors and helps to develop
more qualified firms to compete in the market.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
This chapter presents case study results from the qualitative research phase. Case
studies were conducted with the City of Portland (Oregon) and the City of San Antonio
(Texas). The goal in each case study was to identify what factors impact supplier
diversity policy implementation (Research Question 1). It was expected that the answer
to Research Question 2 would holistically emerge from the interviews held as part of the
case studies. The case studies provided opposite cases: (1) where demographic
characteristics of the public are majority Nonminority and (2) where demographic
characteristics of the public are majority Minority (Figure 5). Both cases have a high
level of supplier diversity policy implementation. Case studies provide a basis for
comparison of the factors that impact supplier diversity policy implementation of local
governments in the United States. Each case study site is situated in a unique
environment/community that is subject to different influences and challenges.
Furthermore, findings of the case studies complement findings of the quantitative
research conducted for this study.
The qualitative research included 19 semi-structured interviews with public
administrators and stakeholders knowledgeable about supplier diversity programs of their
respective cities and, for the City of San Antonio, I observed a Diversity Action Plan
meeting. As discussed in Chapter 3, participants were identified by the point of contact at
each site. The point of contact was provided interview questions approximately one
month prior to my arrival at each site. They each determined who would be the most
knowledgeable about the interview topic, and staff at each site scheduled interviews
accordingly. Interview questions are included in the Appendix.
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Six interviews were conducted with the City of Portland. Two of these interviews
were with representatives from Prosper Portland, which is the City’s economic and urban
development agency. The remaining four interviews were conducted with personnel from
the City’s procurement services office. The average department size for the City of
Portland’s procurement services is 45 employees. The average department size for
Prosper Portland is 18 employees.
Thirteen interviews were conducted with the City of San Antonio. The City of
San Antonio’s supplier diversity programs are all housed under the Economic
Development Department. This department has approximately 38 employees.
Interviewees included representatives from: Alamo Colleges, which hosts a supplier
diversity related program sponsored by the City of San Antonio; San Antonio Water
System; Small Business Advisory Committee; South Central Texas Regional
Certification Agency; Associated General Contractors of America—a large local union;
Tejas Premier Building Contractors, Inc. & Maestro Entrepreneur Center—a small
woman-owned business and a nonprofit providing support for startups and entrepreneurs,
respectively; project manager from a large construction company working on one of the
City of San Antonio’s capital projects; and the City’s Economic Development
Department. Additionally, an audit of a Diversity Action Plan meeting at the City of San
Antonio was conducted.
All interviews at both sites, and the Diversity Action Plan meeting at the City of
San Antonio, were audio recorded. Informed consent was obtained from interviewees
prior to each interview. Written consent was obtained from participants who were
interviewed in-person, and verbal consent was obtained from participants who were
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interview via phone. Each interview was approximately 45-60 minutes. All of City of
Portland’s interviews were conducted in-person. Eleven of the interviews with the City of
San Antonio were conducted in person, with two additional interviews conducted over
the phone—at the request of participants that could not be present at the site. Content
analysis of documentation related to the supplier diversity policies or existing programs
was also conducted for both sites. This documentation was either retrieved from the
City’s website or provided by interviewees.
To protect the identity of interviewees, names and identifying information has
been redacted from transcripts and the dissertation. Because city names have been
revealed, interviewees are referred to as “Anonymous City interviewee” or “Anonymous
external stakeholder/partner interviewee” throughout the text. City characteristics and
demographic characteristics of interviewees are presented in Table 7 and Table 8.
Differences in sites and demographic characteristics of interviewees are highlighted due
to the nature of the topic and theoretical relevance of demographic characteristics.
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Table 7. Case Study Site and Interviewee Characteristics-City of Portland
City of Portland
Population: 647,805
Demographics: Minority: 25.3%; NonMinority: 74.7%
Respondent
Interviewee
Type
1

City

Age
26-35

2

City

46-55

3

City

46-55

4

City

36-45

5

City

26-35

6

City

36-45

Education
Master's degree

Ethnicity
Not Hispanic or
Latino

Some college

Not Hispanic or
Latino

Not Hispanic or
Bachelor's degree Latino
Not Hispanic or
Bachelor's degree Latino
Not Hispanic or
Master's degree Latino
Hispanic or
Master's degree Latino
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Race

# of
# of
Years in Years in
Local Current
Gender Govt.
Org.

White
Male
13
Black or
African
American Female 20+
Black or
African
American Female 20

1

White

Female 21

21

White

Female 12

11

NR

Male

15.5

15.5

5
11

Table 8. Case Study Site and Interviewee Characteristics-City of San Antonio
City of San Antonio
Population: 1,511,946
Demographics: Minority: 74.4%; NonMinority: 25.6%
Respondent
Interviewee
Type

Age

Education

1

City

36-45

2

City

26-35

3

City

36-45

4

City

26-35

Ethnicity
Hispanic or
Bachelor's degree Latino
Hispanic or
Master's degree Latino
Not Hispanic or
Master's degree Latino
Not Hispanic or
Master's degree Latino

5

City

NR

Not Hispanic or
Bachelor's degree Latino

6

City

NR

Juris Doctor

7

City
NR
External
stakeholder/
partner
NR

8

Master's degree

Not Hispanic or
Latino
Hispanic or
Latino

Master's degree

Not Hispanic or
Latino
86

Race

# of
# of
Years in Years in
Local Current
Gender Govt.
Org.

White

Female 13

9

White

Female 6

5

Asian

Female 8

8

White
Male
9
Black or
African
American Female 3
Black or
African
American Male
18

9

White

Female 20+

20+

White

Female 8

10

3
NR

9
10
11
12
13

External
stakeholder/
partner
External
stakeholder/
partner
External
stakeholder/
partner
External
stakeholder/
partner
External
stakeholder/
partner

Not Hispanic or
Latino

Black or
African
American Male

8

8

46-55

Master's degree

56-65

Not Hispanic or
Bachelor's degree Latino

White

Male

30+

25

36-45

Not Hispanic or
Bachelor's degree Latino

White

Male

0

8

46-55

Hispanic or
Bachelor's degree Latino

NR

Not Hispanic or
Bachelor's degree Latino

87

White
Female 13
Black or
African
American Male
0

13
21

To understand supplier diversity and the factors impacting its implementation,
this research draws from literature on representative bureaucracy and contracting. A key
assumption of the theory of representative bureaucracy was that shared demographic
characteristics between organizational actors and constituents leads to policy adoption
and implementation efforts reflecting the interests of those constituents (Mosher, 1968;
Krislov, 1974; Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Frederickson et
al., 2016). The interviewees at each site reflect a range of demographic characteristics
and represent public administrators and external stakeholders/partners impacting and
impacted by supplier diversity. These cases provide an opportunity to learn from different
perspectives relating to the focus of the present study. While interview questions were
structured around key aspects identified in the literature review, the use of open-ended
questions allowed for themes and concepts to emerge holistically.
The data (i.e., transcripts and secondary source documentation) were analyzed
using NVivo 12 software. The analysis of transcripts comprised of interviewees’
experience and knowledge of their respective supplier diversity programs. Through an
iterative process, the interviewees’ responses were categorized by themes and subthemes
(Barnes & Henly, 2018; Foley & Williamson, 2018). The findings were organized around
Research Question 1. It was expected that a response to Research Question 2 would
emerge through the use of open-ended and probing questions. To reiterate, the following
research questions guided this study:
1) What factors impact supplier diversity policy implementation of local governments?
2) Does decision-maker diversity play a role in supplier diversity policy implementation?
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It was expected that motivations for implementation of supplier diversity
programs would differ based on differences between case study sites, in terms of city size
and demographic characteristics of the community. Yet, themes that emerged from
interviews are similar across sites. The findings are described in greater detail in the
sections that follow.
5.1 Community Feedback
The most commonly cited factor mentioned by interviewees driving program
revisions and implementation is feedback from members of the community. Feedback is
obtained from the efforts of local government agencies. In some cases, advocacy
committees and workgroups are created. The local government agencies also conduct
focus groups with a variety of stakeholders to obtain feedback relating to their supplier
diversity programs. Feedback is also obtained from community members who directly
voice their concerns at council meetings or reach out directly to elected officials and
other management staff in the local government agency. These community members can
be individuals or representatives from community-based organizations like Hispanic
Chambers of Commerce (San Antonio) or the National Association for Minority
Contractors (Portland).
In both cases, community feedback prompted the City of Portland and the City of
San Antonio to develop and better implement their supplier diversity programs. For
example, four programmatic recommendations for the City of Portland’s Prime
Contractor Development Program were the result of a workgroup consisting of City staff,
contractors, consultants, and representatives from interested community organizations.
Changes to the City of Portland’s Workforce Program also resulted from community
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feedback. While the City of Portland’s initial disparity study did not result in a specific
goal setting process, they conducted interviews and held focus groups to collect anecdotal
information about barriers facing specific groups of contractors in doing business with
the City of Portland. This led to several programs that the City of Portland implemented.
In the City of San Antonio, the initial round of formal feedback came through a
disparity study, which solicited feedback from the community to include trade association
representatives like the Associated General Contractors group, which has traditionally
opposed these types of programs. After the disparity study concluded, the City of San
Antonio continued to solicit feedback from the business community on disparity study
findings through an extensive process—hosting several meetings and public hearings.
The purpose of this stakeholder process was to help to develop and prioritize remedies for
the issues that were identified by the disparity study. The City was interested in input
from the business community on the best and most appropriate solutions to address these
barriers. The existing City ordinance addressing supplier diversity emerged from this
process (i.e., disparity study and feedback). The process is even described in the City’s
supplier diversity ordinance.
In a similar fashion, the City of San Antonio developed a Five-Year Diversity
Action Plan in collaboration with 20 stakeholder groups, the Small Business Advocacy
Committee, and the Diversity Action Plan Subcommittee. The purpose of the Diversity
Action Plan is to “increase the number of minority and women owned businesses bidding
and participating on City contracts” (City of San Antonio Economic Development
Department, 2019). The City Council adopted this plan in 2018. One interviewee, who
owns a minority-owned business, noted that through participation in the Small Business
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Advocacy Committee, she was able to, as a business owner, identify and voice her
issues/concerns with the existing supplier diversity policies and programs. In San
Antonio, as well as Portland, advocacy groups continue to play an important role in
facilitating communication between the local governments and the community.
In other instances, key community members voice their opinions without being
prompted by a local government agency. These community members include, but are not
limited to, laborers, contractors, unions, and members of local business and other
community groups. An interviewee from the City of Portland noted:
[I have heard] frequently from communities of color in Portland that they are just
not getting opportunities that they need and they are just not getting any of the
notification to bid on projects to be involved in some of the larger projects that are
going on in the city. (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/30/19)
Other interviewees noted that contractors provided feedback such as:
Where are the opportunities for us? You’ve already kicked us out of our
neighborhoods. You already tore down our homes. You already tore down our
business center. And now you are putting up this other gigantic building and there
are no people of color working on it. (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/30/19)
We saw that the City was giving out work and we’re not getting it. (Anonymous
City interviewee, 07/29/19)
While the respective cities prompt the feedback in some cases, City staff realize
that any programmatic changes would not occur without the external sources pushing
these changes. One interviewee from the City of Portland noted that if they “wanted to do
any changes related to the program, that feedback is going to come more from external
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sources, and not necessarily internal sources” (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/30/19).
Another interviewee provided a similar statement, noting that external feedback is what
pushes the agenda. While stakeholders may have competing interests, the success of the
City’s implementation efforts is dependent on support that local government agencies
receive from community organizations and trade unions.
Community feedback is also seen as a way for the government agency to measure
whether the programs are making an impact and if any changes related to implementation
are necessary. An interviewee from the City of Portland noted:
Community feedback is one critical source where we can measure
ourselves because we do have a lot of folks who are very verbal about
where we have been and how we can do better…It tells us that what we
are doing is actually working and it’s valuable. (Anonymous City
interviewee, 07/30/19)
5.2 Political and Executive Support
While community feedback arguably plays the largest role in driving
implementation and holding the local government agencies accountable, action could not
be taken by the local government agency without political and executive support.
Interviewees at both sites asserted the importance of City leadership for the success of the
program. One interviewee at the City of Portland stated, “the program is only as
successful as your leadership.” (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/29/19).
In Portland, the social equity program was spearheaded mainly by the Mayor at
the time, and since that time, subsequent elected officials have been supportive of the
programs. An interviewee at the City of Portland noted that their social equity contracting
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initiative originated from the elected officials, while also crediting the leadership of their
Chief Procurement Officer. This interviewee stated that, “in order to make it (the
program) successful, they need the blessing of council members” (Anonymous City
interviewee, 07/30/19). Another interviewee noted that “the people at the top tell you
where they are headed…change is forced from the top…your leaders tell you where you
need to be going, and then you implement” (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/29/19). A
third interviewee noted that the “City Council micromanages a lot” (Anonymous City
interviewee, 07/29/19). These comments demonstrate the involvement of elected officials
in City of Portland’s program.
Similarly, political and executive support is key in the City of San Antonio. One
interviewee from the City of San Antonio noted that the City Council and Mayor “takes it
seriously… it all started with the council. We have had a very strong, really motivated
council and mayor who supported the inclusivity and who supported this” (Anonymous
City interviewee, 09/16/19). The interviewee also noted that the “impetus (of the City’s
program) was the stakeholders, but then the City Council kind of took it over.” Once the
City Council supports it, the rest of the departments fall in line, even though some
departments may resist it at one point or another. Another interviewee also praised the
City of San Antonio’s elected officials, stating: “I’ll always give them (city council)
credit because they approve everything and so they will stop things if that is not what
they want to see. We couldn’t do it without them” (Anonymous City interviewee,
09/17/19).
The push for supplier diversity programs and active implementation is a
combination of efforts from the city council and people in the community. One
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interviewee, who represents a minority business owner in San Antonio, stated that the
“City Council was pushing for it, but we had to individually educate them” (Anonymous
external stakeholder/partner interviewee, 09/18/19). This interviewee also noted that she
encountered “amazing staff who listened and changed” the way the program is
implemented based on the feedback received from an advocacy committee she was on. In
the City of San Antonio, the business community pushes policy but also partners with the
City on these efforts. Another interviewee noted that the City deserves credit for “going
back and putting together programs that they believe the business community will
support” (Anonymous external stakeholder/partner interviewee, 09/18/19). City
leadership is open to feedback and will revise programs to benefit the business
community within the constraints of law. The interviewee noted several times that the
Economic Development Department’s leadership, and the willingness of elected officials
to work with the business community, has had a great impact. Another interviewee
stated: “we've had a city council who over the years have been more than willing to
learn” (Anonymous external stakeholder/partner interviewee, 09/16/19). An important
note: although interviewees at both case study sites credit elected officials for the success
and push for the implementation of supplier diversity programs, the drive to implement
supplier diversity more actively comes more from leadership being open to community
engagement, feedback, and collaboration while basing decisions on hard and anecdotal
evidence—as required by Supreme Court rulings in this arena of economic inclusion
policies.
The present findings support previous research on contracting out that found
contracting decisions are often political (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005; Brown et al.,
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2006; Krause et al., 2016). Elected officials are subject to pressures from various groups
in the community, and this can drive decisions, preferences, and priorities (Boyne, 1998;
Brudney et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2016; Alkadry et al., 2019). As
evidenced in both case study sites, local government agencies are held accountable to the
demands of their residents and the well-being of their community (Boyne, 1998; Wang et
al., 2014).
The analysis suggests that community feedback and political support for supplier
diversity go hand in hand. Community feedback plays an informative and educational
role as well. This feedback makes elected officials aware of the problem and facilitates
understanding of the barriers faced by certain groups. The feedback is only effective if
the elected officials are willing to listen and learn. Once the officials are aware of the
problem, they are driving forces for supplier diversity programs setting priorities and
providing continuing support to existing operations (Saidel & Loscocco, 2005). Although
diversity of elected officials did not emerge as a factor impacting supplier diversity, it is
clear that support of elected officials facilitates implementation. Instead, political and
executive support is the result of operating in the contracting environment.
5.3 City Mandate
Overall, city mandate reflects the legal environment in which supplier diversity
programs exist and outlines the constraints of law. It is a major tool for implementation
and helps the local government agency with compliance from contractors and program
participants. One interviewee noted that city mandates can be “legally binding” when
included in a contract as well (Anonymous City interviewee, 09/17/19).
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The City of San Antonio has four complementary ordinances that address the state
of business diversity. These force contractors to “be responsible and to be a community
person” (Anonymous City interviewee, 09/16/19) One interviewee—a legal expert in
these matters—noted that the City of San Antonio “thought that was the best way to go
given the very rigorous standards the courts imposed on these kinds of policies…A
significant portion of the ordinance is devoted to recounting the factual predicate”
(Anonymous City interviewee, 09/17/19). The interviewee further noted:
[these policies must] meet the strict scrutiny standard that the Supreme
Court adopted from the Croson decision. Strict scrutiny basically requires
any local government that has a race or gender conscious policy for
contracting to demonstrate that they have a strong basis in evidence to
support a compelling interest for government to consider the use of race or
gender conscious policy elements. That comes out of the equal protection
clause of the 14th Amendment. (Anonymous City interviewee, 09/17/19)
The final version of the City of San Antonio’s main ordinance outlines the various
programs, process in which the programs developed, and multiple options for
implementation.
This finding aligns with research on the contracting environment, which states
that public law dictates the tools and resources available to bureaucrats in contracting
processes (Brown et al., 2006). In addition to adhering to the precedent set by the
Supreme Court in the Croson decision, local government may enact their own policies
restricting or facilitating implementation of supplier diversity (Smith & Fernandez, 2010;
Fernandez et al., 2012; Blount & Hill, 2015). This means that supplier diversity policy
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decisions and actions are mandated by legislation and subject to legal oversight (Sowa &
Selden, 2003; Martin et al., 2007). These mechanisms of control may limit an
organizational actor’s ability to act on behalf of constituents. Instead, local government
agencies rely on hard and anecdotal evidence of past and present barriers identified in
disparity studies to justify, support, and defend supplier diversity programs. Local
government agencies are also careful to not overstep with supplier diversity initiatives
due to the strict legal scrutiny applied to these programs. Case study interviews
demonstrate that city mandates are a strong tool for enforcing and implementing supplier
diversity initiatives.
5.4 Social Equity and Discrimination
Inclusion of minority and women-owned businesses in contracting opportunities
of local government agencies has social and economic implications for these suppliers,
these agencies, and the community. While the main push for accountability and
implementation of supplier diversity programs stems from communication between
elected officials and community members, the reasons these programs exist is because
there is anecdotal and hard evidence of discrimination and injustices that certain groups
have encountered in both cities. In the City of San Antonio, the data show significant
evidence of disparity, discrimination, and barriers for certain ethnic groups. One
interviewee, who had a key role during the development of the City’s ordinance and
related supplier diversity programs, stated that:
[Barriers identified include] everything from unequal access to bonding,
unequal access to capital, good ole boys’ networks that could adversely
affect subcontracting participation by minority and women owned firms,
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unnecessary restrictive bid specifications that had the effect of locking out
minority firms being able to bid on certain contracts. (Anonymous City
interviewee, 09/17/19)
Another interviewee described a time when there were “zero dollars that was spent with
African-American in the areas of construction, architecture and engineering, and this
caused a huge alarm. It was unacceptable for the seventh largest city to have zero dollars
spent with African-Americans” (Anonymous external stakeholder/partner interviewee,
09/16/19). This occurred as late as 2011. The evidence of discrimination is even cited in
the City’s ordinance, which states “the City of San Antonio continues to have a
compelling interest to remedy the ongoing effects of marketplace discrimination against
M/WBE businesses and to avoid becoming a passive participant in private sector
discrimination” (City of San Antonio Ordinance 2016-05-19-0367, 2016).
Similar to the City of San Antonio, the City of Portland also has a history of
discrimination toward certain groups (City of Portland, n.d.). An interviewee from the
City of Portland noted that:
[The state of Oregon has been] very racist towards African-Americans,
Chinese, and Japanese people. There have been some pretty heinous acts.
There has been a lot of displacements. So there is not a lot of trust within
the community, especially African-Americans people, when they are
dealing with the government…I think the community groups feel like this
is finally an opportunity for the City of Portland, the government, to
rectify historical mishaps. (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/29/19)

98

Another interviewee provided a similar account of unfair treatment of certain groups
noting that the City, particularly the Economic Development Agency in Portland, has a
“long, long history of treating communities of color very, very poorly. And in that
history, a lot of the feedback that we’ve gotten from the community over the decades has
focused around exactly that” (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/30/19). This interviewee
reported hearing statements from contractors like “did I even have a fighting chance?” In
the City of San Antonio, an interviewee, who is a minority business owner, echoed this
sentiment, stating that they are “considered high risk from before walking through the
doors” and many times they just “didn’t give me a fair chance” (Anonymous external
stakeholder/partner interviewee, 09/18/19).
A problem that still exists in the City of San Antonio, as recited by interviewees,
is that there is discrimination among minority groups. Their program has seen issues
emerge that were not considered in the past. San Antonio is a majority minority city
where Hispanic groups have a “powerful rank structure” (Anonymous external
stakeholder/partner interviewee, 09/16/19). Statements from interviewees detailing this
issue include: “It’s not a model of true diversity” (Anonymous external
stakeholder/partner interviewee, 09/16/19). “Certain segments of the minority business
community were doing fine, but others were anemic” (Anonymous City interviewee,
09/17/19). “I know that an issue across the board is trying to do business with AfricanAmerican businesses and just reaching out to the community to educate them about
opportunities with our agencies” (Anonymous City interviewee, 09/16/19). One
interviewee went further to note:
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My African-American business peers say that the true minority in San
Antonio isn’t the Hispanic minority because they actually have the
numbers and they have the power. And so it's interesting, though, when
we use the term minority businesses, that includes Hispanics. Then,
oftentimes, the spirit of the council, the spirit of the community will say
yes. But if we didn't talk about the Hispanic community in San Antonio
and made the minority community Black, Native-American, AsianAmerican, then I don't think we would see the same support . And even
when we talk about the leaders who are in charge of city departments, city
manager's office and our elected officials, they do not really understand at
any of those levels, the true nature of what African-American businesses
have to go through. (Anonymous external stakeholder/partner interviewee,
09/16/19)
As a result of previous injustices encountered by certain groups, the general
consensus from interviewees at the City of Portland is supplier diversity programs are
“the right thing to do, at a minimum” (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/29/19).
Leadership and management in the City of Portland are now actively thinking about the
barriers that the City has created because the mindset has shifted and they want to play a
role in making the community better. The City of Portland now develops programs that
support removing those barriers. The City of Portland asserts their commitment to social
equity by using the following guiding questions when implementing one of their
programs: “1. Does the Program expand opportunity for minority and women
contractors? 2. Does the Program effect systemic change? 3. Does the Program have any
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unintended consequences for certain populations and/or communities?” (City of Portland,
2019). One interviewee at the City of Portland noted that now “social equity is just a part
of what they do” (Anonymous City interviewee, 07/29/19).
In both cases, economic development is related to the local government agencies’
focus on social equity. Once these underutilized firms are provided opportunity, they can
grow and help to build community wealth. Both case study sites also have workforce
development programs with this same goal in mind. One interviewee from the City of
San Antonio noted:
Because part of the rationale for these programs is not just that you're
fixing what's wrong or your remedying the discrimination. It's also that
you want a robust marketplace where all segments of business population
have meaningful participation. That is when you maximize job creation.
You maximize tax revenues. You maximize the quality of life. You
enhance the quality of life for everyone. And I always say, if you show me
a community that has a lot of high crime, poor schools, crumbling
infrastructure, I'll show you a community has got an underdeveloped
business community. (Anonymous City interviewee, 09/17/19)
The City of San Antonio’s ordinance relating to supplier diversity solidifies the
commitment, not only to social equity but also to promoting “a robust and inclusive
economy” (City of San Antonio, 2016). In the case of Portland and San Antonio, they
were able to demonstrate the value added to the community by developing and providing
opportunities to women and minority owned businesses.
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5.5 Diversity
Findings support prior research on representative bureaucracy noting the
importance of the representative role and street level representation for active
representation (Thompson, 1976; Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998; Bell &
Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Bradbury & Kellough, 2008). Street level
bureaucrats in the supplier diversity environment often interact with the represented
population and often make decisions related to service provision on a daily basis (Sowa
& Selden, 2003). The street level bureaucrats interviewed strongly relate to and maintain
attitudes reflective of their demographic origins and advocate on behalf of constituents
similar to themselves. These interviewees assumed a representative role, which means
that they “see themselves as advocates for, or representatives of,” minority or gender
interests (Bradbury & Kellough, 2008, p. 698). This aligns with prior research
demonstrating that individuals who assume a representative role can impact whether
passive representation translates into active representation (Selden, 1997; Selden et al.,
1998; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003). Their advocacy and their actions
are reflective of the interests of the groups they represent.
Interviewees described two sides of the story and demonstrated the importance of
diversity and representation. One side came from the minority business owner
perspective, and the other came from City employees who are minorities. One
interviewee, who represents a minority business owner in San Antonio, noted the
importance diversity for supplier diversity efforts by local government: “having diversity
of small business owners on the boards and commission is a must, so that you’re getting a
perspective that is beyond the process” (Anonymous external stakeholder/partner

102

interviewee, 09/18/19). An interviewee at the City of Portland encapsulated the overall
sentiments of City staff and members of the business community regarding diversity:
I think when you have people in supervisory or leadership or management
roles that are diverse, you're going to bring the best of those cultures to the
table and you're not going to leave anybody out. I mean, I think we sit here
sometimes and we act like we represent communities. But if you don't
have true representation at the table, then how are you possibly
representing somebody that's not represented in the conversation?
(Anonymous City interviewee, 07/29/19)
A minority City employee noted:
There's a certain aspect to this particular kind of job where there were
some days where I was feeling a little tokenized, where it’s like you're the
person of color, go talk to the people of color. Go talk to your people
about the opportunities that you have here. You're talking head that they
sent out because you’re a person of color, but it's about being able to get
through that and speak with authenticity. You take the message that they
are telling you back your organization and then make the organization
change a little bit to accommodate their needs. And we've been able to do
that really well. My credibility as a contributor to that and our
organization's credibility is starting to rise really fast with those
communities that have been our staunchest critics in the past. (Anonymous
City interviewee, 07/30/19)
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Even though this interviewee felt tokenized, he was able to advocate on behalf of the
City’s program. He knew that he could connect to the group he was speaking to because
he was like them. Similarly, another minority employee for the City of San Antonio noted
that her background as a female minority is how she “connects with them. You are just
like me. As so that really motivated my passion to help and also just seeing the impact
that our programs had on them and their families. That was a big motivation for me”
(Anonymous City interviewee, 09/16/19).
5.6 Summary
In summary, key factors that impact supplier diversity policy implementation are
community feedback, political and executive support, city mandate, social equity, and
diversity at certain levels in the organization. While it was expected that each site would
provide vastly different motivations for supplier diversity program implementation, there
were several commonalties between the two. Overall, community feedback and political
support are the catalysts for development, revision, and implementation of supplier
diversity. The program is further facilitated and advanced by city mandate, the need for
social equity and the effort to correct historical injustices, and the diversity of
bureaucrats. The city mandate for supplier diversity provides a tool for enforcement of
these policies. The history and recognition of past and current discriminatory practices—
communicated through community feedback, disparity studies, or other reports—provide
justification for the program. Diversity of bureaucrats involved in supplier diversity
initiatives helps to keep the program active. Findings demonstrate that bureaucrats who
assume the minority representative role are advocates for supplier diversity; these
bureaucrats push for active implementation of supplier diversity.
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A word frequency query was performed on interview transcripts and
documentation, and nodes relating to both case study sites using NVivo 12 to represent
the findings. The query was used to create a word cloud. Several key words emerged (i.e.,
community, people, ordinance, equity, disparity, council), demonstrating the importance
of these factors for supplier diversity (Figure 8). The words community and people refer
to the community feedback referenced above. The word ordinance refers to city mandate
or formalized policy. Equity and disparity refer to the motivation to correct historical
injustices and the current presence of barriers for women and minority owned businesses.
Finally, the word council refers to the support of elected officials for supplier diversity
commonly noted by interviewees at both sites.
Figure 8. Word Cloud for Case Study Findings
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The purpose of the dissertation was to examine the factors impacting supplier
diversity policy implementation of local governments, and then to identify whether
decision-maker diversity plays a role in the implementation of supplier diversity policy
programs. This chapter provides an overview of the study and presents implications for
research and practice. Limitations and avenues for future research are also presented in
the sections that follow.
6.1 Overview
According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, organizational actors that
share certain characteristics with constituents (passive representation) are more likely to
respond to their interests through policies and implementation activities (active
representation) (Mosher, 1968; Krislov, 1974; Meier, 1993; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser
et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005;
Bradbury & Kellough, 2008; Riccucci et al., 2015; Bishu & Kennedy, 2019). Prior
literature has identified various instances in which passive representation leads to active
representation (Mosher, 1968; Meier, 1993; Selden, 1997; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Keiser
et al., 2002; Bell & Rosenthal, 2003; Saidel & Loscocco, 2005; Smith & Fernandez,
2010; Fernandez et al., 2012). The premise for active representation is derived from the
similarity between demographics and social backgrounds of bureaucrats and the public
served (Bradbury & Kellough, 2008). These shared characteristics influence attitudes and
values of bureaucrats.
This dissertation examined how representative bureaucracy manifests in the
contracting environment by assessing supplier diversity policies of local government
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agencies in the United States. The contracting environment is unique for two main
reasons. First, contracting practices are constrained by organizational structures and
public law at local, state, and federal levels (Brown et al., 2006; Smith & Fernandez,
2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Blount & Hill, 2015). Public laws and organizational
structures dictate the tools, resources available, and the amount of discretion bureaucrats
have in their work (Keiser et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2006). Contracting policies, such as
supplier diversity, are subject to strict legal oversight (Martin et al., 2007). Second,
previous research on contracting out has found that local government contracting
decisions are political and conducted in response to the demands of their residents and the
well-being of their community (Boyne, 1998; Wang et al., 2014). In this scenario,
decision-makers must balance priorities of stakeholders and public service values like
equity and efficiency (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Krause et
al., 2016; Alkadry et al., 2019). Utilizing mixed methodology, the present research
demonstrates the relationship between organizational representativeness and supplier
diversity implementation within the constraints of the local government contracting
environment.
6.2 Implications for Research and Practice
The findings of this research have implications for the theory of representative
bureaucracy and for practice. The contracting environment is often driven by efficiency
and guided by legal stipulations. The results of this study demonstrate that even while
operating within the constraints of the contracting environment, diversity and
representation within the bureaucracy still remain an important avenue for inclusion of
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minority groups in local government contracting. Additionally, elected officials play a
significant role through their advocacy and support for supplier diversity.
The quantitative analysis shows that minority representation has a larger effect at
the procurement head level, but that it is also significant at the elected official level.
These findings support the relationship between representation at the procurement level
and active implementation of supplier diversity. The qualitative analysis supports the
notion that minority representation of bureaucrats closer to the street level affects supplier
diversity implementation because these bureaucrats have assumed a representative role.
Specifically, street level bureaucrats who assume a minority representative role are more
likely to have greater motivation for supplier diversity. This demonstrates that active
representation (defined by implementing programs supporting minority interests) can
occur in the local government contracting environment. This supports previous research
demonstrating that minority representation in procurement positions—particularly those
with direct oversight of supplier diversity programs, —is related to benefits for minority
owned businesses (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes &
Kellough, 2018). While previous research (Smith & Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al.,
2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018) was conducted at the federal level of government, the
current research shows that the effects of representative bureaucracy in contracting
translates to the local level of government as well.
Qualitative analysis further demonstrates the important role elected officials have
in driving supplier diversity from the top. However, interviews attribute the push of
elected officials in support of supplier diversity to the political system, where elected
officials aim to be responsive to their constituents (Boyne, 1998; Wang et al., 2014). This
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supports previous research on the politics of contracting out (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et
al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2016). Local government agencies are often
responsive to the demands of their residents and the well-being of their community. This
is apparent in the case of supplier diversity. Taken together, this signifies the importance
of minority representation at the procurement head and related street levels and
importance of push and support from top level leadership within the organization.
The present study is among the first to explore the impact of representative
bureaucracy on local government contracting policies. Although the operating
environment of local governments differs from that of the federal government, findings
nearly mirror that of previous contracting research performed at the federal level (Smith
& Fernandez, 2010; Fernandez et al., 2012; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). The results of
the present study demonstrate that even while operating within the constraints of the
contracting environment, minority representation at the street level is important for active
implementation. This supports previous research demonstrating that street level
bureaucrats are better positioned to advocate and act on behalf of constituents (Meier,
1993; Sowa & Selden, 2003). The results demonstrate the importance of a representative
bureaucracy for balancing equity and inclusion in environments where efficiency is key.
Supplier diversity enables not only market competition, but also inclusion and
empowerment of minority owned businesses.
The findings of this study provide important implications for practice as well. The
study highlights the role of leadership in responding to constituent needs and setting
priorities for the organization. Engaging with and listening to constituent needs are key
for providing the direction for a program like supplier diversity. This research also
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highlights the importance of the procurement function and procurement personnel. It
demonstrates that diversity at the procurement head level and related street levels can
facilitate active implementation for supplier diversity. An increased investment in diverse
hiring in procurement roles may produce a more robust supplier diversity program.
Shared characteristics between bureaucrats and constituents helps to provide an
understanding of the barriers faced by certain groups and is related to decisions and
actions that promote the interests of these groups.
6.3 Limitations
This section outlines the limitations of this research. There are four main
limitations. First, the minority classification for the representation variable groups all
minorities into one group. However, it is important to recognize that minorities comprise
a diverse and heterogenous population of numerous races and ethnicities (Selden 1997;
Watkins-Hayes, 2011; Brunjes & Kellough, 2018). As evident from case study findings,
what affects one group may not be the same as what affects another group. Identities,
history, experiences also vary. Findings that emerged from interviews noted that digging
deeper into the data illustrates that disparities within minority groups still exists. Second,
interaction between minority and gender variables were not tested due to the sample size.
Assessing different components of diversity can provide greater insight and contribute
further to the theory of representative bureaucracy. Third, there is an imbalance of data
obtained for the case studies; this research did not include a meeting observation at the
City of Portland or interviews with external stakeholders/members of the community in
Portland. No relevant, comparable meeting—present or past—was available for the City
of Portland. Data from the City of Portland case study are from the perspective of City
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staff only. In contrast, data from the City of San Antonio case study are from the
perspective of City staff and external stakeholders/members of the community. Finally, it
is important to note that the current research is limited to two case study sites. Therefore,
findings may only be transferable to other sites with similar characteristics and those
aiming to answer similar research questions.
6.4 Future Research
Future research can expand on the present study in several ways. First, future
research can disentangle the effects of organizational representation on government
contracting by examining individual minority groups. Second, the interaction between
gender and minority groups should be explored. These can yield significant contributions
and greater understanding for the theory of representative bureaucracy. Third, the impact
of organizational representation on individual minority groups by contract type can
identify where disparities exist in contracting services. Certain contract types yield more
revenue than others (e.g., construction). Fourth, interviews provided insight into several
barriers faced by women and minority owned business and the importance of
communication with the local government leadership to promote their interests. A more
in-depth examination of barriers and facilitators for women and minority businesses
owners to participate in contracting opportunities can produce actionable
recommendations for government decisionmakers to promote a more inclusive
contracting process.
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APPENDIX
Case Study Interview Questions
1)

Can you please tell me about your social equity contracting or supplier diversity

program? Probe: How were these initiatives/policies introduced?
2)

What factors do you think played the most important role in its adoption? Probe:

How did the supplier diversity policy originate or how was the program introduced? Or
how was it developed? Probe: When did it originate? Probe: Who were the champions
of this program at this time?
3)

What does your agency currently or most actively do as it relates to supplier

diversity?
4)

What motivates/influences/affects the current implementation of your social

equity contracting programs? Probe: What are some of the issues that you face in
implementation of this program?
5)

How do you monitor and evaluate your program? Probe: Are there different

measures for each group (women and minorities)? Probe: What do you consider as
success?
6)

What do you consider as your biggest achievements? (top 3 achievements)

Probe: Can you elaborate of these?
7)

What aspects have been challenging in terms of implementation? (top 3

challenges) Probe: Can you elaborate on these? Probe: How have these challenges been
addressed and/or resolved?
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8)

How do you advertise or inform women and minority owned businesses about

your initiatives? Probe: Are there specific initiatives aimed at one group versus the other
or are they the same for all? Explain (if different).
9)

What do you think is the biggest challenge facing women and minority owned

business contractors in participating in government contracting opportunities? Probe:
Do you think they face challenges in undertaking and completing the work? Please
elaborate.
10)

Who are the biggest champions of supplier diversity in your agency?

a.

What do you think motivates them to be champions?

b.

How diverse is your unit?

c.

In what ways does this affect implementation?

11)

What is the role, if any, of third-party organizations for the implementation of

your supplier diversity program?
a.

When did the partnership begin?

b.

What specifically do these third-party organizations do to foster supplier diversity

in your organization?
12)

What pressures external to (or outside of) the organization impact supplier

diversity policy implementation? Probe: How do these pressures impact supplier
diversity policy implementation (positively and negatively)?
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